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In this dissertation, I explore bidders’ behavior in multiple auctions 
which are conducted sequentially or simultaneously. The first and the second 
chapters examine buyers’ bidding behaviors in an environment of multiple 
simultaneous auctions and show that the wildly-used assumption of proxy 
bidding is inappropriate in the multiple auction setting. The first chapter 
proposes two models which try to describe online auction platforms. One model 
has a fixed ending time and the other does not. I show that incremental bidding 
strategy can arise out of equilibrium and weakly dominate the proxy bidding 
strategy. Late bidding is also discussed. I use the data I collect from eBay to test 
these theoretical predictions in the second chapter. The estimation results 
 vii
basically support the theory part. Incremental bidders who switch among 
different auctions are more likely to win and have higher payoffs than proxy 
bidders.  
The third essay studies the procurement auctions in the Texas school 
milk market. I define score functions to map the bids from multiple dimensions 
to one dimension and analyze the factors that may affect the bids of school milk 
suppliers. After considering the impacts of these factors including backlogs and 
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Chapter 1
A Theoretical Study of Incremental Bidding in
Competing Simultaneous Auctions
1.1 Introduction
With the fast development of the internet services in the past decade, online
auctions have been established as a convenient and widely-used method for
purchasing and selling everyday commodities. Online auctions di¤er from tra-
ditional auctions in that bidders often have to face several overlapping auctions
at the same time. Some popular internet auction sites, such as eBay, provide
platforms for the sale of a mass amount of identical or very similar goods. When
you make a search for some popular product, you can always nd several auc-
tions running in parallel. For instance, in early 2008, a search of "Wii console"
leads to around 6000 auctions on Ebay. Though the items are almost homoge-
neous, these auctions can be di¤erentiated in other ways, like the duration of
the listing, the shipping methods and sellersreputation. The sellers of these
auctions actually compete with each other for selling their goods. Since it is
almost costless for buyers to move from one auction to another, we can expect
that a buyers bidding behavior will be a¤ected by the existence of competing
auctions.
The increasing popularity of online auctions has stirred a great amount of
economic research. Most existing literature, however, treats auctions as isolated
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from each other. A consequence of this is that the proxy bidding strategy 
submitting only one bid which is your true willingness to pay is commonly
used in theoretical models. In this paper I examine an environment in which
several auctions are conducted simultaneously. We will see that proxy bidding
cannot be assumed for granted and incremental bidding strategy should not be
ignored.
Incremental bidders are players who bid multiple times in one auction. The
evidence in the laboratory and the eld indicates that this type of bidders
widely exists. Ockenfels and Roth (2006) reports that in their data set the
average number of bids per bidder is 1.89 and 38 percent of the bidders sub-
mit more than one bid.1 However, the reason for incremental bidding is often
explained as the ignorance of the bidders. That is, either these bidders mis-
understand the auction rules or they are uncertain about their own valuations.
Ockenfels and Roth (2006), Ely and Hossain (2009) describe incremental bid-
ders as inexperienced, naive bidders who mistake eBays proxy system for an
ascending-price auction. Hossain (2008) includes uninformed bidders in his
model. He proves that these buyers are unclear about their true willingness
to pay and thus bid incrementally to acquire more precise information on their
valuation of the object.
In the data set I collected from eBay, the proportion of incremental bidders
is even higher. They actually prevail over proxy bidders who submit their val-
ues before the last minute. Since so many incremental bidders exist, a question
1Other studies, e.g. Wilcox (2000) and Ariely et al. (2005), also mention the phenomenon
of incremental bidding.
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arises: Is it really the ignorance that leads them to bid multiple times? To
answer this question, this chapter develops two connected models of concurrent
auctions to provide some theoretical support for the incremental bidding strat-
egy. One model is about auctions with exible ending times, while the other
deals with parallel auctions which have xed ending times. The two di¤erent
closing rules allow us to exclude or include another commonly observed bid-
ding behavior  late bidding, sometimes also called sniping. In private-value
models, late bidding can be a best response to incremental bidding. Ockenfels
and Roth (2006) suggest that late bidding is a bidders best reply to an incre-
mental bidder, if his value is lower than the value of the incremental bidder.
In my models, I will show that compared with the proxy bidding and the late
bidding strategy, incremental bidding behavior allows buyers to collect more
information about bids received in each auction and therefore other bidders
values. Further, incremental bidding gives buyers much more exibility than
proxy bidding to respond to irrational bidders.
My work draws on the literature that considers the impacts of competing
auctions and the incremental bidding behaviors. In recent years, some ex-
perimental and empirical works have been done to explore the phenomenon
of incremental bidding in online auctions. However, there are few theoreti-
cal papers on this topic. Probably the most related research is the study of
simultaneous ascending auctions by Peters and Severinov (2006). They build
a decentralized dynamic mechanism with multiple simultaneous auctions. The
ending rule of this mechanism does not involve any restriction on time and
there are no bidding costs. They characterize an equilibrium in which buyers
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bid incrementally in rounds and move among di¤erent auctions. When all the
bidders follow this strategy, prices are expected to be uniform across all auc-
tions. Since the setting of the model is in an o­ ine context, only incremental
bidding behavior is discussed in this paper. Stryszowska(2005) models simul-
taneous online auctions as second-price multi-unit auctions. Bidders submit
multiple bids to coordinate between auctions. She analyzes the case when there
are only two auctions running at the same time.2 This paper aims to provide
some insights of the incremental bidding in the theoretical models that try to
describe the online auctions in the real world.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, the theo-
retical model with exible ending times is presented. Section 1.3 extends the
model to cases with xed ending times and introduce the last-minute bidding.
Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Simultaneous Auctions with Flexible Ending Times
1.2.1 Basic Model
As explained above, the incremental bidding strategy is usually related to the
late bidding strategy. To get rid of late bidding and focus on the comparison
between proxy bidding behavior and incremental bidding behavior, I rst study
auctions which have exible ending times. In this setting, the auctions are
automatically extended if some bidder submits a bid right before the scheduled
2There are other works , e.g. Hendricks et al. (2008) and Zeithammer (2004) theoretically
and empirically study bidding behavior in sequential online auctions. Another theorictial
approach of simultaneous auctions focuses on the price dynamics of the auctions, e.g. Hyde
et al (2006) used Functional Data Analysis to study the price process of simultaneous auctions.
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ending time. This automatic extension rule assures bidders that they will
always have an opportunity to respond to the changes of prices. In reality,
both Amazon and Yahoo use this soft closing rule. The auctions are designed
similar to the model described as below.
Suppose time is discrete, t = 1; : : : ; T; where T is the scheduled ending
period. If no one places a bid at period T , all auctions close at T: Otherwise,
the ending time is extended to the next period. The auctions will end in
the rst period after T in which no one submits a new bid. Without loss of
generality, we assume there are 2 auctions and 3 risk-neutral bidders. The
objects sold in these auctions are identical and only one unit of goods is listed
in one auction. Each auction has a starting price, or a minimum initial bid, m
at t = 1: Suppose bidder i arrives in period i. Each of them has an inelastic
demand for one unit of the item. Bidder i0s true willingness to pay, vi, is drawn
independently from a continuous distribution F (); with support on [v; v]: Each
bidder knows only his valuation and the distribution F ():
Bidders need to decide whether to place a bid and if he bids, which auctions
he should choose and how much he should bid. A new bid placed by a buyer




; so that if all the three bidders would like to raise prices increment by
increment in these two auction, they would have enough time to do so.
The following restrictions on buyersbidding strategies are imposed. First
of all, in every period t, each bidder can only bid in one auction. This restriction
implies that if a bidder is the current high bidder in some auction, then he will
not submit a bid in the other auction. It also implies that if a bidder is not the
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high bidder in either auction, then she submits only one bid. Secondly, high
bidders do not raise their own bid in this soft-ending game. With these two
restrictions, we know that the current high bidders will remain inactive until he
gets overbid. As a result, each bidder has a decision to make only in periods
when he is not a high bidder.
In each period t, the bidders observe the identity of the current high bidder
and standing high bid, or say the current price, in each auction. Let ist and
wst denote respectively the identity of the high bidder and standing high bid
in auction s in period t: If no one has bid in auction s prior to period t, then
ist =  and wst = m; the starting price. If only one bidder has submitted a bid
prior to period t, then that bidder is the high bidder and wst = m+ d, where d
is a small increment. Otherwise, wst is equal to the second-highest bid plus an
increment.
Dene xt = (i1t; w1t; i2t; w2t). A bid history is given by ht = (x1; ::; xt):
A period-t strategy for a bidder who is not a high bidder in either auction in
period t is given by
it : Ht ! f0; 1; 2g  <+:
Here 0 denotes the action in which the bidders does not bid. Otherwise, the
strategy maps the history of play into a choice of auction and bid.
At Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the strategy used by each player will maxi-
mize his expected payo¤ given their beliefs about other bidders and the strate-
gies played by other bidders. Now lets see how a proxy bidding strategy and
an incremental bidding strategy are dened in this model.
6
Denition: A proxy bidding strategy, bi; for player i is given by, for t  i,
bit(ht) =
8><>: (s; vi) if wst < ws0t and vi > wst if vi  minfw1t; w2tg :
If w1t = w2t < vi, then bidder i chooses auctions 1 and 2 with equal probability
and bids vi:
This strategy prole means that if a bidder uses the proxy bidding strategy,
he will choose to bid in the auction which has the relatively lower standing bid.
Further, he always bid his true willingness to pay whenever he is not a high
bidder and at least one auction has a standing price lower than his valuation.
Denition: An incremental bidding strategy, i , for player i is given by, for
t  it;
it(ht) =
8><>: (s; wst + d) if wst < ws0t and vi > wst if vi  minfw1t; w2tg :
If w1t = w2t < vi, then bidder i chooses auctions 1 and 2 with equal probability
and bids wst + d:
For the incremental bidding strategy, the choice of the auctions to participate
is the same as the proxy bidding. The only di¤erence is that, with this strategy,
bidders always raise the standing price by the smallest increment.
Lemma 1.1 Any strategy prole in which every bidder submits his value vi on
arrival cannot arise in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See the chapter appendix.
Note that the strategy proles stated in lemma 1.1 include the pure proxy
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bidding strategy dened above. The intuition behind this lemma is that when
all the bidders submits his true willingness to pay when he enters the auction,
the two bidders with highest values may happen to bid on the same item.
Although they made the best decision using the information revealed from the
standing bids, they fail to obtain enough information about the high bids. Their
payments depend on the existing highest bid in each auction. However, a low
standing bid in an auction does not necessarily imply that the high bid in
this auction is also low. Some bidder enters an auction which already has
a very high bid, thus he and the existing high bidder are involved in a erce
competition against each other. As a result, they are trapped into paying a
higher price than necessary. The competition can be avoided if the new comer
can learn more about the highest bid in each auction before he places a bid.
The incremental bidding strategy is useful in serving this purpose.
Theorem 1.1 There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which every bidder





Proof. See the chapter appendix.
The denition of  characterizes a completely incremental bidding strategy.
Using this strategy, a bidder always participates in the auction which has the
lowest price. He moves among auctions and bids the smallest amount possible.
This allows him to get more information about the high bid in each auction.
When he becomes a high bidder, the standing bid of that auction is at the
lowest level he can ever nd. During this process, the bidder is competing with
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some current high bidder who is the most likely to have a low valuation. So the
excessive competition among bidders with the highest values no longer exists.
If we let v(i) denote the ith order statistic of the biddersvaluation. Under this
incremental bidding strategies, equilibrium prices in both auctions are always
v(3) (plus d) and the outcome is always e¢ cient. However, as shown in the
proof of lemma 1.1, when all bidders use proxy bidding strategy, the price of
some auction could be as high as v(2):
It can be shown that if we relax the second restriction stated above and
allow the high bidders to raise their own bids, the incremental bidding strategy
dened above is still an equilibrium. According to eBays rule, if a current high
bidder raises his bid, the standing bid remains the same and the new bid he
submitted becomes the highest bid. As a result, the behavior of other bidders
who follow incremental bidding strategy will not be a¤ected. Thus raising his
own bid is not a protable deviation for the high bidder. The restriction that a
high bidder cannot raise his bid can be loosen without a¤ecting the equilibrium
outcomes.
1.2.2 Discussion
The incremental bidding strategy has two advantages. One advantage as shown
above is that it allows the bidders to learn which auction has the lower high
bid. The second is that it allows the bidders to respond to some non-equilibrium
behavior of rival bidders. Consider the case in which we allow the high bidders
to raise their own bids. Then we will have a group of di¤erent strategy proles
that can construct the equilibria. These strategy only needs to require bidders
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to bid incrementally when they are not high bidders. After a bidder nds out
the auction with the lowest high bid and becomes a high bidder, the next period
he could raise the standing bid by any amount that not exceeds his valuation.
As long as everyone uses such a strategy, the outcome of the game would be
the same as the case that everyone uses the pure incremental bidding strategy.
However, the strategy that a bidder will remain inactive until he gets outbid
weakly dominates any strategy that the bidder submits an additional bid after
he becomes a standing high bidder. The reason is that this strategy gives a
bidder the exibility to respond to the non-equilibrium behaviors. For example,
suppose a bidder i submits his true willingness to pay vi when he is the current
winner in that auction s. Now if a buyer j comes in and he does not follow the
equilibrium strategy. For some reason buyer j bids vi   " in auction s: Even
if the high bid of the other auction is much lower than vi   "; bidder i cannot
switch to it. He has already committed himself to auction s when he submitted
his value. If he had stopped bidding as soon as he became the high bidder,
he would have been outbid by bidder j and could always move to the other
auction.
The fact that the incremental bidding strategy prevails in this model relies on
the assumption that it is costless to submit a bid. The proxy bidding strategy
certainly has more advantages when the biding cost is involved. This model
gives us a taste that incremental buyers may not bid multiple times because
they are naive or are o¤ the equilibrium path. The existence of simultaneous
auctions can be a reason for submitting multiple bids.
10
1.3 Simultaneous Auctions with Fixed Ending Times
1.3.1 Basic Model
An important structure of the previous model is the ending rule. Now we
impose the xed ending time to make the model more similar to eBay auctions.
The basic set up is the same as before, except that both auctions end at period
T: In the auctions with the xed ending rule, apparently lemma 1.1 still holds.
The problem of proxy bidding strategy high value bidders may participate in
the same auction still exists. Thus, the proxy bidding still cannot construct
the equilibrium of the xed ending auctions. However, the pure incremental
bidders also face some challenges now.




3) is not a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
See the chapter appendix for the proof. The intuition behind this lemma is
not complicated. If buyers follow i ; they still act as there is no xed ending
time and submit bids only when they are outbid. Consider a buyer whose value
is relatively high. If he bids incrementally before the auctions end, he makes
the competition among buyers ercer and pushes up the price. If he bids at
the last minute, he can win an item for sure at a relative low price.
The incremental bidders are indeed naive if they still use strategy  in
this environment. However, they can easily avoid losing at the last minute by
submitting their true willingness to pay at T: Consider the revised incremental
bidding strategy o as follows.
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Dene a modied incremental bidding strategy, oi , for player i as, for T >




For t = T; player i increases his bid to vi in auction s if he is the high bidder
in that auction s.
Theorem 1.2 There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which all bidders





This new strategy will eliminate a bidders incentive for sniping. If every
incremental bidder submits their true value successfully right before auctions
end, there is no potential benets from late bidding. The sniper cannot win
an item unless he has a high value. There is simply no reason for a buyer to
wait until the last minute to bid. The late bidding strategy, just like the proxy
bidding, will probably trap a bidder into a competition with high value bidders.
Placing bids at an earlier time, as what incremental bidders do, will enable
buyers bid in a cooperative way. They move around and spread in di¤erent
auctions. Bidders with relatively low valuation will leave the auctions during




As explained in the models with exible ending time, it is weakly dominated for
buyers to submit their true valuations too early. Bidding their true values early
will make them lose the opportunity to switch to auctions with lower prices
if some non-equilibrium behavior occurs. Theorem 1.2 tells that as long as
incremental bidders bid their true values at the last minute, there will not be any
late bidders at the equilibrium. However, the question is whether incremental
bidders really understand this situation and always submit successful bids before
ending. In reality it may happen that some people forget to monitor the auction
he participates in or fail to submit a last-minute bidding due to problems of the
internet service. If some of the incremental bidders are unable to bid their true
value before the ending time, it still leaves last-minute bidders the opportunity
of obtaining extra surplus.
Now we consider a more general situation, where there are S auctions and
S+1 bidders. Suppose everyone except the last bidder uses incremental bidding
strategy. And some of them are sophisticated bidders who bid up to their value
at the last minute, while other are native, then when the last bidder arrives,
should he use incremental bidding or wait to snipe?
Theorem 1.3 Suppose a bidder knows that beside him, a proportion of 
incremental bidders follow oi and the other 1    incremental bidders follow
i : Whether it is more protable for him to use the last-minute bidding strategy
than to use the incremental bidding depends on the value distribution F , the
number of auctions S; the proportion  and the standing price wst. When  is
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xed, facing the same standing price wst, a buyer is more likely to snipe when
S is small.
This theorem tries to describe the real world more precisely by including
both the sophisticated incremental bidders who bid their true value at T and
the naive ones who do not. Now the bidder S + 1 tries to decide whether to
start bidding or wait until the last minute. When he bids before T , the bidder
S + 1 can learn about other biddersvaluation gradually. In order to win, he
only needs to defeat the current high bidder who has the lowest value. To nd
out this bidder, he bids incrementally and brings up the price. When bidder
S + 1 bids at the last minute, he needs to defeat the bidder who he selects
randomly. But when he wins, there are chances that he participates in an
auction with a naive incremental bidder who does not bid his true value at the
last minute. Then bidder S + 1 will pay a relatively low price. If he meets
a sophisticated incremental bidder, whether he can win depends on the order
of their values. Thus it is more di¢ cult for bidder S + 1 to win a randomly
selected sophisticated bidder at the last minute. In sum, bidder S + 1 faces
a trade-o¤. If he bids at the last minute, the expected payo¤ conditional on
winning is higher, however the probability of winning may decreases. Which
strategy is better is ambiguous.
At some given standing price wst, the bidders beliefs about a current high
bidders value is set. Since a sniper can only bid in one auction, the winning
probability and the expected payo¤ of sniping is not a¤ected by S. If he plays
the incremental bidding strategy, he loses only when his valuation is lower than
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the valuation of every current high bidder. When S is large, this situation is
less likely to happen and the expected payo¤ of incremental bidding is higher.
Therefore, the bidderwould rather bid incrementally before T when S is large.
Theorem 1.3 demonstrates that even with a xed ending time and some naive
bidders, incremental bidding may still yield higher payo¤s than late bidding.
1.4 Conclusions
In summary, this study shows that the existence of simultaneous auctions a¤ects
buyersbidding behavior, and some widely used assumption in single object en-
vironment cannot be used for granted. The models constructed in this chapter
provide some theoretical support for incremental bidders. Unlike in a single on-
line auction, the proxy bidding strategy may not be the best choice for bidders
when multiple concurrent auctions exist. The proxy bidding makes a bidder to
commit to one auction, while incremental bidding allows the bidder to acquire
information about the high bids and react to irrational bidding behaviors. The
incremental bidding is superior in that it allows bidders to coordinate and it
gives bidders a lot of exibility. If a buyer can follow this strategy, he would
be more likely to win. And on average, an incremental bidder would pay less
than a proxy bidder if they have the same distribution of valuation.
When there is a xed ending time, if incremental bidders can successfully
submit their true willingness to pay at the last minute, there would be no
late bidders at the equilibrium. Otherwise, snipers may get beneted from
late bidding. The equilibrium outcome depends on factors like the number of
15
concurrent auctions.
I focus on the positive side of incremental bidding in this paper and argue
that incremental bidders exist for a reason. However, this does not imply proxy
bidding should be discarded. As discussed in Section 1.2, it can construct an
equilibrium for each bidder to submit a proxy bid after becoming a standing
high bidder, although this strategy is weakly dominated by incremental bidding.
Here I assume that there is no cost for submitting a bid and everyone is able
to monitor the auctions until the end. In reality, some people may be very
busy and value their time a lot. They will not be patient enough to submit




1.5.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
Consider the following case. Suppose when bidder 3 arrives, bidder 1 and bidder
2 have already submitted their true valuation. I will show that bidder 3 can do
better than submitting his valuation on his arrival. To maximize their expected
payo¤s, bidder 1 and bidder 2 must have bidden on di¤erent auctions. To see
this, consider these two bidderschoices. For the bidder 1, the two auctions are
the same - starting prices are the same and no one has got a bid. The expected
payo¤ from either auction, therefore, is the same. He will choose an auction
randomly, say auction 1, and place his bid. The standing bid of auction 1 will
become m + d, while the standing price of auction 2 remains to be _m. When
the second bidder arrives, he will bid in auction 2 which has a lower standing
price and thus can give him a higher expected payo¤. So he bids his value in
auction 2 and the standing bid of auction 2 also becomes m+ d,
Now the standing bids of the auctions are both wst = m+ d. Bidder 3 sees
the prices and the identities of the current winners. Each bidders valuation
is private information, so he cannot tell the di¤erence between the rst two
bidders. This means, for bidder 3, the two auctions are identical. So he will
bid on either item with the same probability. There is a positive probability
that biddersvaluations are ordered as v3 > v1 > v2 > m; i.e. the bidder 3 is
the highest value. If he submits v3 on arrival, with 1=2 probability, he would
bid in the same auction as bidder 1 and end up paying v1 for the item he wins.
But he could always win an item at the price of v2 if he follows the incremental
17
bidding.
In general if everyone bids his value when he enters, the bidder with highest
value has 50% chance to win an object paying the second order statistic of the
biddersvalues. While if he follows the incremental bidding, he will always win
an object paying the third order statistic which is lower than the second.
Formally,if bidder 3 submits his true value on arrival, his expected payo¤ is:
EU3 = [v3   E(vijv3 > vi > wst)]  Pr(v3 > vijvi > wst) +
[v3   E(vjjv3 > vj > wst)]  Pr(v3 > vjjvj > wst)  Pr(v3 < vijvi > wst):
Let p denote the probability Pr(v3 > vijvi > wst), then
EU3 = [v3   E(vijv3 > vi > wst)]  [p+ p(1  p)]
= [v3   E(vijv3 > vi > wst)]  (2p  p2)
Instead, if he uses incremental bidding, his expected payo¤ would be
EU o3 = [v3   E(vijminfv3; vjg > vi > wst)]  Pr(v3 > vi or v3 > v2jv1 > wst and v2 > wst)
= [v3   E(vijminfv3; vjg > vi > wst)]  [1  Pr(v3 < v1jv1 > wst)  Pr(v3 < v2jv2 > wst)]
= [v3   E(vijminfv3; vjg > vi > wst)]  [1  (1  p)2]
= [v3   E(vijminfv3; vjg > vi > wst)]  (2p  p2)
 [v3   E(vijv3 > vi > m)]  (2p  p2) = EU3
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E(vijminfv3; vjg > vi > wst)] is actually the expected value of the 3rd
statistic of bidders valuation given that it is higher than wst and lower than v3:
Therefore, bidder 3 could benet if he deviates from bidding his true value on
arrival. This means that the situation in which everyone bids his true valuation
on arrival is not an equilibrium strategy. 
1.5.2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Bidder i0s information set consists of the current standing bids and high bidders
identities in all the auctions. His beliefs are that the valuation of each high
bidder is no less than the standing bid of the corresponding auction. To be
more specic, at any time t; before bidder i submits a bid, suppose bidder j
is the current high bidder in auction s, or say ist = j; and the standing bid
of auction s is wst: Then bidder i0s belief about bidder j0s value vj at this
information set is that vj  wst: According to i ; every bidder only submits a
bid if his value is higher than the standing bid. So, apparently, this belief rule
 is rational on the equilibrium path where each bidder plays i :





: That is, no buyer can improve his payo¤ by a deviation from i given the
specied belief . Note that if everyone follows i ; a bidder always bids on
the auction with the lowest standing bid and always raised the price by an
increment. The di¤erence between prices of any two auctions is at most as
large as the increment d: A bidder quits the auctions if and only if the standing
bids of both auctions are higher than his value. Suppose v(k) denotes the kth
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highest of buyersvalues. So at equilibrium the two bidders who have highest
values among all buyers win an item and they pay the price equal to the v(3).
(I) First of all, as dened, player i starts to bid if he is not a current high
bidder at period t . Suppose auction s has the lowest standing bid before he
submits any bid at t: The standing bid of auction s, as dened above, is wst:
If bidder i0s value vi is higher than wst; I will show that he will not improve his
payo¤ if he does not bid at t:
To see this, at period t; as long as vi  wst; bidder i would have non-negative
expected o¤ if he follows i : If bidder i deviates and does not bid at all from t
and thereafter he will get 0 for sure, which is weakly dominated by i :
Consider other deviations in which he does not bid at t; but bids at some
period t0; where t0 > t: At t0 he follows some strategy and the last bid he
submits before auctions end is bi  vi: This strategy is weakly dominated by
submitting bi at period t: Because the extensive ending rule allows every bidder
to respond, the situation he faces at t0 would be the same as he submits the bid
in period t: Since other bidders still follow , to win an item, bidder i still
need to beat at least one buyers to win an object. And when others follow ;
if bidder i wins, his payment would always be v(3): So the probability of winning
does not increase and the expected payment does not decrease. Waiting until
t0 does not improve bidder i0s expected surplus. Moreover, bidder i runs the
risk that auctions may end before t0 if t0 > T: Therefore it is weakly dominated
for bidder i to start bidding until t0:
This implies if bidder i is not a high bidder in any auction and he has a
higher value than the standing price of some auction, he will always participate
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in bidding whenever he gets the chance.
(II) The next step is to show that when a buyer bids, he will always choose
the auction with the lower standing bid. Suppose w1t > w2t: There is a possibil-
ity that the highest bid in auction 2 is below w1t and thus below the highest bid
in auction 1. Therefore the expected winning probability of bidding in auction
2 would be higher than bidding in 1, and the expected payment conditional on
winning would be lower. Thus the bidder would always choose the auction
with the lower standing bid.
(III) The last step is to show that when a buyer bids and he has chosen
to bid on the auction with a lower price, he cannot do better than raising the
price by more than the increment. As long as other two bidders follow  and
bidder i is not the bidder with the lowest value, he will always win an auction
and pays v(3): And if he is the bidder with the lowest value, he can never win
an auction and will always receive zero payo¤. (Or negative payo¤s if he bids
above his value, which is obviously dominated.) His payment relies on the value
of the other two bidders, and bid more cannot increase his winning probability
or reduce his payment. However, bid more than the increment can lead to
higher payments when other bidders go o¤ the equilibrium path. The reason is
similar to lemma 1.1. So bidding more than the increment is weakly dominated
by following i :
Step (I) - (III) complete the proof there is no protable deviation from :
So  maximizes biddersexpected payo¤ given the specied belief . 
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1.5.3 Proof of Lemma 1.2
Suppose the other two bidders, say bidder 1 and bidder 2, follow ; which
means they only raise the standing bid by the increment. Then bidder 3 can
infer that the highest bid in the auction bidder 1 or 2 participates would be
equal to the second highest plus the increment. In other words, the standing
price is actually the highest bid in the auction. When bidder 3 enters in period
3, he will observe that the prices of both auctions would be m + d, which is
what must occur at period 3 when bidder 1 and 2 play the strategy  in period
1 and 2:
Now, bidder 3 knows that if he does not raise the bid, bidder 1 and 2 will
remain in active as dened by : Thus he can choose any auction at period T
and bid m+2d: He will win the object for sure at this low price m+2d: If he
also follows  and start to bid at period 3, the other two bidders will react to
his bid. As long as bidder 1 and 2 have valuations higher or equal to m+ 3d;
which is highly possible, bidder 3 can no longer win an object at m+2d: Thus
if bidder 3 deviates from  and wait till period T to bid, he can increase the
winning probability and reduce the expected payment conditional on winning.
Therefore, there is some protable deviation from  and  is no longer an
equilibrium. 
1.5.4 Proof of Theorem 1.2
As in theorem 1.1, bidder i0s beliefs are that the valuation of each standing high
bidder is at least as high as the standing bid of the corresponding auction. If
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everyone follows oi ; they will start to bid whenever they arrive. In the proof
of theorem 1.1, I show that any deviation that does not involve last-minute
bidding is not protable. Here I only need to check that the last-minute
bidding strategy is not a protable deviation.
When other bidders follow oi and the price level stays at wst; if bidder i
bids before T; he only needs to be one of the two high value bidder in order to
win an object. So the expected payo¤ of bidder i if he bids before T is the same
as before, which is
EUEi = [vi   E(vjjminfv jg > vj > wst)]  [1  Pr(vj > vijvj > wst)2] :
If he only bids at the last minute, he will randomly choose on one auction
to bid in. This is because all auctions have the same price and reveal the same
information. His expected payo¤ from bidding in any auction is the same,
which is
EULi = [vi   E(vjjvi > vj > wst)]  [1  Pr(vj > vijvj > wst).
Since
E(vjjminfv jg > vj > wst)  E(vjjvi > vj > wst);
so
EULi  EUEi .
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The intuition is that when a bidder snipe at the last minute, he needs to
defeat the bidder which he randomly chooses and there is a possibility that he
chooses the auction in which the standing bidder has the highest value among
the three. Therefore, late bidding cannot improve a bidders payo¤ and and
there is no protable deviation from oi . The revised incremental bidding
strategy still constructs an equilibrium. 
1.5.5 Proof of Theorem .3
Suppose every buyer except bidder i bid incrementally. If bidder i snipes at
T; with probability , he will meet and a buyer who bids his value and with
probability 1   ; he will meet someone who is inactive at T . When bidder i
observes no adjustment in the standing bids and winnersidentities, he knows
that only S buyers besides him are in the auctions. The price level of auctions
is denoted as P: Bidder i0s belief about other bidders is, for any bidder j; his
valuation vj  wst: Based on this belief, he can calculate the probability of his
value is lower than a current high bidder. This probability, Pr(vj > vijvj > wst);
is denoted as q:
Then his expected payo¤ from bids early and bids incrementally is
EUEi = [vi   E(vjjminfv jg > vj > wst)]  (1  qS) .
His expected payo¤ from late bidding is
EULi = [vi   E(vjjvi > vj > wst)]  (1  q)(1  ) + (vi   wst)   .
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We know that [vi   E(vjjvi > vj > wst)](1   q) < [vi   E(vjjminfv jg >
vj > wst)](1   qS) < (vi   wst); so the relationship between EUEi and EULi is
ambiguous. Note that since E(vjjminfv jg > vj > wst)] is the expected value
of v(S+1) given that v(S+1) is between vi and wst; it should decrease in S when
everything else equal. EUEi is increasing in S and q should be the same under
the same wst: If we compare two groups of concurrent auctions which have the
same standing prices, we know that bidders in the larger group which has more
auctions are less likely to snipe. 
25
Chapter 2
Are Incremental Bidders Really Naive?
Evidence from eBay Auctions
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provides some theoretical support for the existence of
incremental bidders. The basic idea suggested by the model is that incremental
bidding is more exible than proxy bidding and allows bidders to switch to
other auctions that are less competitive. In this chapter I will use the data
collected from eBay to see if we can nd empirical evidences that are consisted
with the theory.
Not much empirical work has been conducted on competing online auctions
until recent years and the views on incremental bidding are mixed. Anwar et
al. (2006) provide one of the rst empirical evidences that support incremental
bidders. They suggest that eBay bidders do submit multiple bids and bid
across competing auctions. They also state that the cross-bidders tend to
place bids on the auctions with the lowest standing price. In the study, to
overcome complications associated with heterogeneity in item conditions and
delivery methods, they focus on competing auctions run by the same sellers.
With this restriction, to have enough competing auctions, they have to relax
the denition of competing auctions. Though they aim to explore concurrent
auctions, the interval between the ending times of the competing auctions in
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their sample is up to one day.
Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc (2008) have some di¤erent thoughts on in-
cremental bidding. They ran concurrent eBay auctions in pairs in a controlled
experimental design. These pairs involved two identical or very similar auc-
tions. They argue that only a small proportion of bidders ever do cross-bidding
and only a little over a half of the switches are moved to the auction with a
lower price. Since there are just two auctions in a pair, a random bid will have
50% chances to be placed on the lower priced auction. Thus, there is no strong
support to show that incremental bidders switch to auctions that can give them
higher payo¤s.3
In recent years, more individuals start to use online auction platform to buy
or sell goods and services. For example, eBay, the most popular online auction
site in US, had more than 90 million active users during the year 2009, who
contributed to a total trading volume of more than $48 billion. The richness of
the data from these online websites allows us to take a closer look of competing
auctions. Wii consoles were released in late 2006 and became very popular in
US from 2007. This phenomenon provides people a good chance of making
prots from reselling the game consoles on auction websites and thus gives us a
good opportunity to examine the competing online auctions. In the data set I
collected from eBay during mid 2008, I can nd enough competing auctions that
are almost homogeneous in everything. So unlike what Anwar et al. (2006)
3Some other experimental papers have payed attention to the impacts of competing auc-
tions. For example Lin and Jank (2007) further analyze the bidder migration which is similar
to the cross-bidding behavior discussed in this paper. They argue that the reasons for the
migration is either the bidders were outbid or bargain hunters are looking for a good deal.
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did, I am able to ignore the identity of sellers and dene competing auctions as
auctions which end very closely to each other.
The analysis of the data in this paper shows more evidences in favor of
incremental bidding from buyersperspectives. Incremental bidders are more
likely to win than proxy bidders and last-minute bidders. Although the prices
they pay are not as low as those paid by last-minute bidders, they do beat proxy
bidders when they make use of the exibility of this strategy. To be more
specic, if incremental bidders move back and forth among auctions instead of
sticking to one auction, on average they will pay less than proxy bidders on
winning.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
data and introduces some important statistics. Section 2.3 presents the major
regression results on winning probabilities and winning prices. Di¤erent type
of bidding strategies, proxy, incremental and late bidding are explored together.
More discussions on late bidding and incremental-bidding are contained in Sec-
tion 2.4. The concluding remarks are in Section 2.5.
2.2 Data Description
2.2.1 Characteristics of Auctions
The data used in this study includes the information of all the Wii console auc-
tions that occurred on eBay between June 04 and June 12, 2008.4 I select the
4The data contains every listing ends in this time period. Auctions with a hidden reserve
price are only included if the reserve price is met. I exclude Dutch Auctions, in which
multiple items are listed in one auction, and Private Auctions, in which biddersinformation
is not revealed. Buy-It-Nowauctions are also excluded from the dataset.
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Wii console because the auctions of this commodity have some nice characteris-
tics that match closely with the environment of the theoretical models proposed
in the second chapter. First of all, new items prevail in these auctions. The
retail price of this new product can be found very easily, but bidderswillingness
to pay is private information. This is consistent with the private value setting.
The online trade of this product provides two ideal features for investigating
competing auctions high frequency and homogeneity.
Due to its limited supply at retail stores and the popularity of this item,
the Wii console was one of the hottest commodities on eBay. In 2007, the Wii
is the second best-selling game console (behind the Nintendo DS) in the US.
However, it is not easy to nd a retail store that has a stock. As a result, many
buyers turn to eBay to buy it. A high volume of transactions take place on
eBay every day.
Table 2.1 gives a description of the frequency of auctions. The dataset
consists of 4256 auctions. On average, one item is sold in less than three
minutes (162.4 seconds). Since most products are sold during the day time,
the intervals between two auctions which end next to each other are very large
during the nights. The median of these intervals is much smaller than the
average and is only 73 seconds. A large proportion of auctions in the data have
parallel peers which end at almost the same time. If two auctions end within
ve minutes, we say each auction has a 5-minute concurrent auction. 97.5%
of auctions have at least one 5-minute concurrent auction and 86.2% have at
least one 2-minute concurrent auction. Each auction on average has 5.69 5-
minute concurrent auctions and 2.23 2-minute concurrent auctions. In reality
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it takes time for a bidder to enter an auction or to check whether he wins an
item. When an auction ends, losers may not be able to submit a bid in the
next auction which will close immediately. Thus, bidders are likely to treat
auctions with small di¤erence in ending time as simultaneous auctions.
The frequency of auctions varies from day to night. A gure of the dis-
tribution of auctions by ending times is included in the appendix. It shows
the average proportion of auctions end in each hour. The percentage is al-
ways above 5% between 8 am and 8 pm. I will dene this time period as
peak hours. If we compare the auctions conducted during the peak hours
and non-peak hours, we can nd some di¤erences in the winning price and the
crowdedness. The mean of winning prices is a little lower during peak hours,
and the average number of bidders is about the same in either period. However,
auctions end during peak hours receives more bids.
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics about Auction Frequency
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Median of Intervals b/w Auctions (seconds) 73 - - -
Average Interval b/w Auctions (seconds) 162.4 706.29 0 20461
Auctions with 2-min Concurrent Auctions 86.2% - - -
Auctions with 5-min Concurrent Auctions 97.5% - - -
Average Number of 2-min Concurrent Auctions 2.23 1.63 0 9
Average Number of 5-min Concurrent Auctions 5.69 2.94 0 15
Another interesting fact of online Wii console auctions is the homogeneity.
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Sellers on eBay are mostly retailers who earn prots from reselling the consoles.
They not only sell the identical products, but also collaborate tacitly in other
aspects. They tend to use the same descriptions for their items, set the same
starting prices and provide the same shipping service. An example of auction
listings on eBay is presented in the appendix. From this group of listings, we
can see that all the sellers chose the same title and similar descriptions for
their auctions, and they all o¤ered free shipping for the items. To present a
more complete view on the auctions, Table 2.2 shows the statistics of all the
major characteristics of eBay auctions. In general, 93.56% of auctions charge
no additional fees for the shipment. In 91.71% auctions, the starting prices are
set as 99-cent or lower, which is a very small amount comparing with the retail
prices of the Wii console or the winning prices of the auctions. When sellers list
items, they can choose the duration of the listing among 1, 3, 5, 7 or 10 days.
In our sample, a great majority, 86.72%, of the auctions are 1-day listings.
The eBay allows sellers to promote their items with listing upgrades at some
extra charges. One of the most attractive upgrades is called Featured Plus.
When a seller chooses this option, his item will appear in the featured item
section at the top of the search results page. The auctions without this service
will be listed after the featured items. This extra service seems to quite e¤ective
especially when there are many auctions going on simultaneously. Since a buyer
usually browses a webpage from the top, his attention is more likely to be drawn
by featured ones. When a buyer has a time limit to submit a bid, he may not
have enough time to look at all the listings on the webpage. Then the ordinary
auctions posted on the lower half of a webpage will attract fewer buyers even if
31
they have lower standing prices. Apparently, most sellers value this option and
thus 77.91% of listings are featured. Another upgrade option is to make the
title bold so that it stands out from other auctions in the list of search results.
About 20.16% auctions have bold titles. When the data were collected, other
promotion methods were used less often and thus omitted from the dataset.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Auction Characteristics
Characteristic Percentage
Free Shipping 93.56%




The feedback rating of sellers can be see as a di¤erence among auctions and
may potentially a¤ect buyersbidding decisions. The rating is obtained in the
following way. After each transaction is completed, eBay will ask the seller
and the buyer to leave a comment and a rating for each other. The feedback
score of a seller or a buyer is the sum of the ratings he has received, which
can be positive, negative or neutral.5 A sellers rate is the percentage of the
positive feedback scores he has received. In Table 2.3, we see that both the
feedback scores of the buyers and of the sellers have large variations. However,
5Right after our data were collected, eBay changed the feedback policy to protect buyers.
Now sellers can only leave positive ratings for buyers.
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the ratings of sellers do not di¤er much. Most sellers have very high overall
rates, the mean of which is 99.15%.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Auction Characteristics (ctd.)
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SellersFeedback 966.50 5687.08 -1 177252
SellersRate (%) 99.15 4.05 0 100
BuyersFeedback 95.28 384.72 -1 8991
Number of Bids 25.63 10.24 1 81
Number of Bidders 12.69 4.34 1 28
Starting Price 17.45 73.44 0.01 589.99
Shipping 1.44 6.06 0 47.98
Winning Bid (No Bundle) 324.14 28.02 210.5 500
Winning Bid (w/ Bundle) 409.85 40.04 255 605
Some sellers bundle two extra remote controllers and a game disk with the
Wii console. The extra controllers are must-haves for multi-person games and
most buyers need them. However, the supply of controllers in retail store is not
as limited as that of consoles, and the prices of controllers are relatively cheap.
So the price of a bundle mainly depends on buyerswillingness to pay for the
console. The price di¤erence between a console and a bundle is around the
retail price for the controllers and the game disk. I do not expect buyersbidding
behaviors to change much when extra controllers are o¤ered. The only change
they will make in the auctions of bundles is that buyers add an extra amount
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to their bids. The amount of money is supposed to be around the retail prices
of the extra controllers and the disk. On average, 12.69 bidders participate in
each auction. The mean of bids received on each item is 25.63. This infers
that there are multiple bidding buyers in the data sets. As stated above, most
sellers provide free shipping and choose a nearly-zero starting price. Among
those who make di¤erent choices, the di¤erence in shipping cost is relatively
small while the starting prices vary a lot.
Among these 4256 auctions, in 116 auctions every bidder places only one
bid. So only 2.7% of the auctions are not a¤ected by buyers who bid multiple
times. This illuminates that incremental biding is the choice of many bidders
and cannot simply be ignored as non-equilibrium behavior. Theoretical mod-
els suggest that the existence of several competing concurrent auctions a¤ects
buyersstrategies. To track their bidding behavior on auctions which overlap
the sample auctions, I collected the data of the biding history of every auction
that ended as early as May 25, 2008 and as late as June 22, 2008.
2.2.2 Classication of Bidders
In the data set, we observe di¤erent bidding behavior. To dene the types of
bidders in the sample, let me rst explain the meanings of the incremental bid
and the proxy bid used in this empirical study. The bidding mechanism of eBay
allows a buyer to submit any bids that are equal higher than the standing price
plus a bidding increment. If a bid is exactly equal to the standing high bid plus
an increment, this bid is called the incremental bid. If a bid is higher than the
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standing price plus the increment, it is treated as a proxy bid. Just like the
settings in the theoretical models, the standing price in an eBay auction is the
second highest bid plus an increment and the highest bid will not be posted.
The bidding history of auctions contains information about the type of each
bid, automatic or non-automatic. If a bid is placed by the bidder himself, it
is recorded as a non-automatic bid. If eBay adjusts bids on a bidders behalf,
these bids will be shown as automatic bids.
When an incremental bid is placed and becomes the highest bid, the standing
high price is actually equal to the highest bid. And the incremental bids are
always non-automatic bids. Meanwhile, if a proxy bid is submitted, the true
value of this bid is hidden from other bidders and the standing price is still the
second highest bid plus an increment. In bidding history, this new standing
price is shown a non-automatic bid submitted by the high bidder. When other
bidders submit new bids, eBay will adjust the standing prices accordingly. It
will raise the price on the bidders behalf as much as necessary to maintain
the bidders position as the high bidder. The price goes up to the maximum
value that the bidder has submitted. These bids posted by eBay will be shown
as automatic bids. Thus, in the data of bidding history, a proxy bid will be
observed as a non-automatic bid followed by automatic bids.
Note that in the empirical study, the denition of proxy bidding is a little
di¤erent from the the one in the theoretical part. Since a bidders value is
his private information and the highest bid in an auction is not observed, in
practical it is not possible to tell whether a bidder has submitted his true
willingness to pay. So here in the study as long as a bidder raises the standing
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price by more than the increment and allows eBay to bid on his behalf, this
bid is considered as a proxy bid. Though this generalized proxy bid may not
be a bidders true willingness to pay, it does have similar properties as the
proxy-bidding dened before. For instances, it may let the bidder involve
in unnecessary competitions with other high value bidders, and it also allows
eBay to adjust the standing bid on the bidders behalf. Actually the name of
proxy-bidding comes from this automatic price-adjusting mechanism of eBay.
Therefore, when a bidder submits a bid that exceed the standing price by more
than an increment, and uses the proxy bidding mechanism provided by eBay,
we will call this bid a proxy bid.
Based on the denition of bids and the bidding history data, I classify bid-
ders as following. If a bidder always places proxy bids, he is called a pure proxy
bidder. If a bidder always bid incrementally by himself, we call him a pure
incremental bidder. A Proxy-incremental bidder is the bidder who rst sub-
mits proxy bids and then submits incremental bids, while an incremental-proxy
bidder is the bidder who rst submits incremental bids and then submits proxy
bids. If a winner never gets outbid and only one bid from him appears in the
bidding history, it is not possible to distinguish the type of this bid. However,
since he wins, this bid is the last bid in the auction and usually placed quite
late. Winners who submit these last bids within 10 minutes before the auction
ends are treated as last-minute bidders, or say snipers. Other winners who
submit the only bid relatively early do not fall in any groups of our interests.
As shown in Table 2.4, 1221 out of the 4256 winners are last-minute bidders.
762 winners are pure proxy bidders, while 773 bidders are incremental. 1449
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winners are mixed bidders who have submitted both proxy bids and incremental
bids. To be more specic, 314 of them use proxy bidding when they won and
the rest 1135 winners bid incrementally when they won. For the other 51
winners, we cannot tell the exact type of them.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Winners Type
Winners Type Numbers Percentage of All Winners
Last-Minute Bidders 1221 28.69%
Pure Proxy Bidders 762 17.90%
Pure Incremental Bidders 773 18.16%
Incremental-proxy Bidders 314 7.38%
Proxy-Incremental Bidders 1135 26.67%
Unclassied 51 1.20%
The Figure 2.2 in the appendix illuminates the proportion of di¤erent types
of bidder in winners and losers. From the gure, we can see that the percentages
of proxy bidders and incremental-proxy bidders in losers are higher than those in
winners. Note that the incremental-proxy bidders are not incremental bidders
who submit their maximum willingness to pay at the last minute. Rather, they
act more similarly to pure proxy bidders and submit their willingness to pay at
a relatively early stage.
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Table 2.5: Submitting Time of Last Bids
from Each Type of Winners








To investigate the mixed bidders more carefully, I examine the timing of last
bids placed by each type of winners. The result is reported in Table 2.5. The
incremental bidders place their last bids around ve and a half minutes (327
seconds) before auctions close. Not surprisingly, the winners who use proxy
bids submit their last bids (also their only bids) much earlier, at about one hour
(3737 seconds) before ending times. Nevertheless, incremental-proxy bidders
place their last bids even earlier (5285 seconds before auctions end). The
pure proxy bidders and the incremental-proxy bidders are similar in that both
types commit themselves to one auction long before it ends, and are not able to
switch to a di¤erent auction. Therefore, from here I will treat these two types
of bidders as one group. Similarly, incremental bidders and proxy-incremental
bidders will be considered as in one group, because both types of buyers are
still able to bid on other auctions when they place their last bids. Moreover,
on average, the last bids from incremental bidders are placed around the same
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time as those from last-minute bidders. It shows that most incremental bidders
remain active until auctions end.
Table 2.6: Summary Statistics of All Bidders and
Proportion of Winners in Each Group
Group Number of All Bidders Serious Bidders
Winners Number % of Winners Number % of Winners
1 1221 10943 11.16% 8745 13.96%
2 1076 24438 4.40% 14419 7.46%
3 1908 16000 11.93% 10217 18.67%
4 51 2559 1.99% 437 11.67%
Table 2.6 shows the classication of all bidders and the percentage of win-
ners among each type of bidders.6 It gives us a general idea of the winning
probability of di¤erent types of bidders. Serious bidders are are dened as bid-
ders whose last real bid (his bid plus shipping cost) is above $200. Group
1 consists of last-minute bidders. Group 2 contains proxy bidders, including
pure proxy bidders and incremental-proxy bidders. Group 3 is composed of in-
cremental bidders, including pure incremental and proxy-incremental bidders.
Group 4 are the bidders that do not t in any denition of the bidders type.
6Here, because of the di¢ culty of tracking losers in di¤erent auctions, I treat every bidder
as a di¤erent bidder in di¤erent auctions. That is, when I calculate these percentages, I
assume each bidder participates in only one auction. With this assumption, the winning
probability of every group will be underestimated. However, the average number of auctions
that each winner participates is approximately the same for all the groups. As long as this
is also true for losers, the order of the probability remains the same. This means, compared
with the proxy bidders, a larger proportion of incremental bidders have won an item.
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11.93% of incremental bidders are winner while only 4.40% of proxy bidders
win an auction. The proportion of winners in last-minutes bidders is between
the above two groups. To exclude some non-serious bidders, I also look at the
percentages among serious bidders whose last bid is above $200. Again, the
proportion of winners is the highest in the incremental bidders group, and is
the lowest in the proxy bidders group.
2.2.3 Cross Bidding
In chapter 1, the theoretical results from the models of simultaneous auctions
imply that a bidder should bid in the auction with the lowest standing bid. If a
bidder is aware of the existence of several competing auctions and understands
the rules well, he should always switch to the auction with the lowest price
whenever possible. Then we will be able to observe buyers bid across competing
auctions. In this section, I explore the causes and the e¤ects of this cross-
bidding behavior.
Although we do see a large proportion of bidders participate in multiple
overlapping auctions, one may argue that this is caused by the re-entry of
losers. When a buyer loses in one auction, he will probably bid again in
another auction which ends a few minutes later.7 Since the competing auctions
do not end at exactly the same time, this argument is sensible. To distinguish
bidding in several auctions simultaneously from bidding sequentially, I dene
cross biddingmore strictly. Consider a bidder who at rst bids in auction
7Hendricks et al. (2008) show this phenomenon and study the e¤ects or re-entry in se-
quential auctions.
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A and then starts to bid in auction B. I say he makes a switchif auction A
is still open when he places his rst bid in auction B. Bidders who ever make
a switch are called cross bidders. It is reasonable to believe that these cross
bidders understand the multiple auctions environment and do not stick to only
one auction at a time. They move to a new auction not because they cannot
bid in the old auction anymore, but because they decide not to do so. If a
bidder has ever made a switch, he is treated as a cross bidder. Any type of
bidders, proxy bidders, incremental bidders or late bidders can be cross bidders.
2.3 Estimation Results
2.3.1 Winning Probability of Di¤erent Types of Winners
We know that whether a buyer can win an item largely depends on his valuation,
and thus the amount he bids. When we look at the numbers shown in Table
2.6, a question arises naturally - is the higher proportion of winners among in-
cremental bidders caused by higher bids? To answer it, I run a probit regression
of the winner dummy on biddershighest bids8 and the groups they belong to.
The dependent variable is one if a bidders highest bid is the winning bid of
that auction, and is zero otherwise. Table 2.7 reports the maximum likelihood
probit coe¢ cient estimates. As expected, the coe¢ cient of highest bid is posi-
tive and signicant which means that the higher a buyer bids, the more likely
he is about to win. Further, we can see that the dummy for late bidders and
8Although most sellers o¤er free shipping, others still charge a fee for the shipment. The
bid value used here is the sum of a bidders highest bid and the shipping cost of the item.
Other auction characteristics variables can be added to the regression, but the main results
remain the same.
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Table 2.7: Probit Regression of Winners on Bidding Values and
Bidder Types
Variables All Bidders Serious Bidders
Constant -7.089 -7.062
(0.096) (0.098)
Highest Bid of the Bidder 0.019 0.019
(0.000) (0.000)
Dummy for Last-Minute Bidders 0.386 0.386
(0.026) (0.026)
Dummy for Incremental Bidders 0.452 0.453
(0.025) (0.025)
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.26
The dependent variable is the dummy for winners. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Variables that are signicant at the 5% level are marked with an asterisk. Those that
are signicant at the 1% level are marked with double asterisks.
incremental bidders are both signicantly positive. Thus among buyers whose
highest bids are similar, incremental bidders and last-minute bidders win with
a higher probability than proxy bidders. The estimate of incremental bidders
is larger than late bidders. This is consistent with what we see in Table 2.5,
among all buyers, the incremental bidders win with the highest probability. As
the theoretical model suggests, proxy bidders may end up with excessive com-
petition among themselves in some of the auctions. They could have won an
item if they had switched to a less competitive auction as incremental bidders
did. This evidence from data casts doubt on the proxy bidding mechanism.
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2.3.2 Impacts of Cross-Bidding on Winning Prices
Among the 4256 winners, I observe 2352 switches across di¤erent auctions.
Moreover, 85.88% of these moves are from the auction with a higher standing
price to the auction with a lower standing price. This nding provides evidence
that cross-bidding behavior is related to the di¤erence between the standing
bids of competing auctions. From a theoretical perspective, if there are enough
bidders who move around and bid across several auctions, the nal prices for
items in the concurrent auctions should be close to each other. Then, to an
individual bidder, whether he switches or not may not make big di¤erence for
him. However, in reality there are still many proxy bidders and price dispersion
exists most of the time for various reasons. In this situation, a bidder who moves
around tends to benet from this cross-bidding behavior.
The following regression analysis shed light on how the winning price of an
auction relates to a bidders ability of cross-bidding and other auction charac-
teristics. The dependent variable in the regressions reported in Table 2.8 is the
real price of each auction, which is the sum of the winning bid and the shipping
cost. The regression in the rst column does not consider the xed e¤ects of
specic ending times, except that a dummy variable for peak hours is included.
The second column report results when dummies for ending days and ending
hours are included. The coe¢ cient estimates on cross-bidding are negative and
highly signicant in these two regressions. The information revealed is that
winners who ever bid across di¤erent auctions do pay lower prices than those
who do not. Note that the cross-bidding winners are not just those bidders who
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switch to the auctions they win, but also bidders who have ever made switches
among other auctions.
This is because I consider the cross-bidding behavior as a bidders ability,
not a one-time result caused by the di¤erence between prices. If a winner never
moves between the auction he wins and other auction, the reason could be that
the auction he wins always have the lowest price, not that he commits himself
to only one auction. Therefore if he had made switches before, we have reasons
to believe that the winner understands the situation and we still treat him as
a cross-bidder. When facing the price dispersion in competing auctions, these
cross- bidders see the di¤erence and switch to auctions with lower standing bids.
As a result, they win an item, they tend to win it at a lower price.
In addition, the negative coe¢ cient on the dummy for peak hours may serve
as another evidence for the advantage of cross-bidding. As described above in
section 2.2, the number of bidders remains the same across the time, while the
number of bids is higher during peak hours. The price level, however, has not
been driven up. Bidders have more opportunities to bid across items during
peak time, because more auctions are open in this period. As a result, a bidders
number of bids and number of switches both increase. The number of bids has
a positive e¤ect on prices, but the price level in peak hours decreases. Thus
winning prices are probably brought down by bidderscross-bidding behavior.
The prices of featured items exceed the non-featured items by a large amount.
Although eBay charges $24.95 for this upgrade, the regression results show that
this extra service is indeed worth the price. On average the featured items are
sold for about $35 more than the non-featured ones. It is shown above that
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Table 2.8: Regression of Winning Bids
Variables Estimates





Buyers Score 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)




Starting Price 0.18 0.18
(0.01) (0.01)
Dummy for Peak Hours -3.27 -
(1.05) -
Number of Bids 0.54 0.55
(0.06) (0.06)
Number of Bidders 0.22 0.08
(0.16) (0.16)
Dummy for Bold Titles 0.62 0.31
(1.06) (1.06)
Dummy for Featured Items 35.35 36.70
(1.34) (1.35)
Dummy for Bundles 80.15 79.84
(0.89) (0.88)
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.739
The dependent variable is real price, which is the sum of the
winning bid and the shipping cost.
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most sellers have paid for this option and thus they got a surplus of about $10
per item. On the other hand, the upgrade option of bold titles is not quite
e¤ective. Though the charge is low, sellers should not waste money on it.
Again, a majority of the sellers have made the right choice.
In general, the number of bids, rather than the number of bidders, a¤ects
the winning prices. It implies that bidders who keep placing bids in one auction
drive the bidding competition more ercely and push up the prices. This result
seems against the incremental bidding strategy. However, it is only against the
naive incremental bidders who do not switch to auctions with lower prices.
These bidders usually have limited knowledge of the concurrent auctions, thus
limit their attention to one auction at a time. If a bidder does not make use
of the exibility of the incremental bidding strategy, there is no reason for him
to do better than a proxy bidder. This can be seen more clearly in the next
section.
2.3.3 Winning Prices of Di¤erent Types of Winners
It has been shown that incremental bidders are more likely to win than proxy
bidders. The next question raised here is whether they win at lower prices.
The answer to this question also relates to the cross-bidding behavior. Now,
instead of the dummy for cross bidders, I include the dummies for di¤erent
types of winners in regressions of real prices. The estimates on other auction
characteristics variables are similar to the results in Table 2.8 and are omitted
here. The coe¢ cients on dummies for last-minute bidders and incremental
bidders are reported in the rst two columns of Table 2.9. The real price paid
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Table 2.9: Regression of Winning Bids on Winners Type
Variables Without With Without With
Fixed E¤ects Fixed E¤ects Fixed E¤ects Fixed E¤ects
Last-Minute Bidders -9.39 -8.81 -9.75 -9.144
(0.99) (0.99) (1.02) (1.10)
Proxy Bidders 0.47 0.72 -0.18 0.11
(1.03) (1.02) (1.17) (1.16)
Last-Minute Bidders - - -4.39 -4.46
Cross-Bidding (1.99) (1.98)
Proxy Bidders - - 2.14 -2.18
Cross-Bidding (1.94) (1.93)
Incremental Bidders - - -4.72 -4.62
Cross-Bidding (1.43) (1.42)
Adjusted R2 0.739 0.745 0.740 0.745
by last-minute bidders is signicantly lower than the other two groups. This is
consistent with the prediction of the theoretical models that last-minute bidders
enjoy a larger surplus whenever they win. Incremental bidders, however, fail to
show any advantage over proxy bidders in winning prices. As explained above,
this may be caused by their limited cognition of the coexistence of multiple
auctions.
To verify this guess, we need to investigate the di¤erence between winners
who bid across auctions and those who do not. Therefore, the cross terms of
the dummies for each type and the dummy for cross bidders are added in the
regression. The estimation results are displayed in the 3rd and 4th columns in
Table 2.9. The cross term for incremental bidders is signicantly negative. It
conrms the prediction that incremental bidders who understand the compet-
ing auctions and switch around get beneted from the cross-bidding behavior.
Their winning bids are not only lower than incremental bidders who stick to
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one auction, but also lower than proxy bidders. Last-minute bidders who have
ever made switches also pay lower prices than their peers. The reason is that
these cross-bidders examine more than one auction before they place bids and
are more likely to bid on items with the lowest standing prices. Nevertheless,
proxy bidders are very di¤erent from the other two types of winners. Whether
they are cross-bidders or not does not seem to a¤ect their winning prices. This
is because they commit themselves to one auction too early. Although some of
them are aware of concurrent auctions, they cannot switch to other auctions.
So this knowledge is useless to them after they submit the proxy bids.
In sum, incremental bidders prevail against proxy bidders, if they really
make use of the exibility of incremental bidding to move across auctions. Oth-
erwise, if they just bid over and over in one auction, they have no advantages
over proxy bidders. We can say that keeping bidding in one auction without
checking out other auctions is a naive behavior. But as I shown here, not all
incremental bidders are naive. Some of them are aware of the situation with
multiple concurrent auctions and try to get the best out of it by cross-bidding.
They are even more sophisticated than proxy bidders in this sense. As a result,
they win with a higher probability and win at a lower price level.
The theoretical model does not show that last-minute bidders will pay less
than incremental bidders. Nevertheless, this can be explained by the di¤erence
between models and reality. If submitting a bid is costly, "incremental bidders"
may raise bids at an amount larger than the increment. If there is a cost to
monitor and switch to another auction, incremental bidders are not as exible
as last-minute bidders. These will lead incremental bidders to pay a little
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higher than last-minute bidders.
2.4 More Discussions on Di¤erent Type of Bidding
2.4.1 Impacts of Concurrent Auctions on Late Bidding
As described in the theoretical part, when naive incremental bidders exist, last-
minute bidding can be a best response under some circumstances. Lots of
factors may inuence a bidders decision of late bidding. Here I focus most
attention on the impacts of the competing auctions. To verify theorem 1.3, I run
an ordered Probit regression. The dependent variable is the number of snipers
who submit bids within 5 minutes before an auction ends.9 The explanatory
variables are the standing bid at that time and the number of parallel auctions
which end no more than 2 or 5 minutes apart from the current auction. Results
are shown in Table 2.10. When the standing bid is relatively high, fewer
bidders snipe this auction. The number of late bidders also decreases in the
number of competing auctions, which conrms the prediction. The estimate
for the 2-minute concurrent auctions is signicant at 1% level, while for the
5-minute ones, the estimate is signicant at 10% level. This implies that the
late-bidding behavior is more a¤ected by auctions that end really close to each
other. Competing auctions weaken a buyers incentive to bid late.
9The regression results remain almost the same if we relax the timing to 10 minutes before
the ending.
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Table 2.10: Regression of Number of Snipers
Variables Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value
Intercept 1.049 0.000 1.081 0.000
(0.199) (0.199)
Standing Bid -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of 5-Min Concurrent Auctions -0.011 0.086 - -
(0.006) - -
Number of 2-Min Concurrent Auctions - - -0.031 0.007
- - (0.012)
2.4.2 Impacts of Concurrent Auctions and Past Experience on Bid-
ding
From the other aspect, theorem 1.3 also suggests that bidders are more likely to
bid incrementally and switch around when there are more concurrent auctions
if they understand the situation well. Also, to see whether the incremental
bidders are naive or sophisticated, we can look at their past experience. Do
the incremental bidders have lots of shopping experience at eBay? Have they
participated in a similar auction before? To see what factors can cause a bidder
to use incremental bidding strategy, I run some probit regressions.
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Table 2.11: Probit Regression of Incremental Bidders
Variables All Serious All Serious
Bidders Bidders Bidders Bidders
Constant -1.31 -1.29 -1.38 -1.21
(0.198) (0.212) (0.202) (0.225)
Log of Buyers Score 0.021 0.028 0.023 0.030
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Dummy for Previous Experience 0.133 0.143 0.139 0.146
(0.151) (0.138) (0.129) (0.132)
Number of 5-Min Concurrent Auctions 0.013 0.016 - -
(0.007) (0.008) - -
Number of 2-Min Concurrent Auctions - - 0.021 0.024
- - (0.009) (0.009)
In Table 2.11, the dependent variable is the dummy for incremental bidder,
i.e. it equals one if a bidder is an incremental bidder, and zero otherwise. The
regressions only examine the e¤ects of a few factors. The buyers feedback
score, which basically depends on how many items they have ever bought or
sold at eBay, can reect their shopping experience. The log of this variable
is used here. A buyers bidding strategy may also be a¤ected by whether he
has participated similar auctions in the near past. A dummy for this is also
included and equals one if a bidder joined an auction before. Note that most
buyers have a single unit demand, so the past experience is usually a losing
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Table 2.12: Probit Regression of Incremental Bidders Who Cross-Bid
Variables All Serious All Serious
Bidders Bidders Bidders Bidders
Constant -1.71 -1.79 -1.88 -1.91
(0.218) (0.322) (0.219) (0.325)
Log of Buyers Score 0.031 0.038 0.033 0.040
(0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012)
Dummy for Previous Experience 0.183 0.163 0.159 0.176
(0.125) (0.088) (0.130) (0.087)
Number of 5-Min Concurrent Auctions 0.011 0.015 - -
(0.006) (0.007) - -
Number of 2-Min Concurrent Auctions - - 0.026 0.028
- - (0.010) (0.008)
experience. The rst two columns use the number of 5-minute concurrent
auctions as an explanatory variable, and the last use the number of 2-minute
concurrent auctions. In the rst and third columns, the sample includes all
the bidders in the data set. The rest two only contains serious bidders whose
highest bid (his bid plus shipping cost) is above $200.
The estimation results do show that buyers are more likely to choose in-
cremental bidding when there are more competing auctions, especially in the
regressions with serious bidders. However the e¤ects of buyersexperience do
not seem to be strong. This phenomenon may be caused that the compo-
sition of incremental bidders is quite complicated. The naive ones and the
sophisticated ones probably coexist.
Thus I change the dependent variables a little bit and dene the dummy
to be one when a buyer bids incrementally and switch around, zero otherwise.
The purpose is to focus on the relatively sophisticated buyers who use cross-
bidding. All other elements of the regressions remain the same as before. T
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he estimation results are presented in Table 2.12. The coe¢ cients on buy-
ersfeedback score become more signicant, which imply that the incremental
bidders who cross-bid do have more trading experiences on eBay. The e¤ects
of concurrent auctions are similar as before. The incremental bidding is more
likely to be observed. However, the dummy for past bidding is still not very sig-
nicant. A possible explanation is that the past experience, especially the past
losing experience may have a mixed impact on a buyers decision. On one side,
after participating a similar auction, the buyer understands the rules, the cir-
cumstance and the potential opponents better. This learning e¤ect may cause
him to use more complicated strategies like cross-bidding. On the other side,
after losing an auction, the buyer may become more desperate, or feel tired in
monitoring the auctions frequently, or simply believe there are too many naive
incremental bidders. All these changes in his mood may push him away from
incremental bidding, therefore he probably just submit a proxy bid or wait to
snipe.
These regressions give us some insights on things that may induce incremen-
tal bidding. I have run similar regressions on the dummy for cross-bidders and
the results are very similar to the ones in Table 2.12. In short, it is more likely
for bidders who often buy or sell on eBay to cross-bid and bid incrementally.
The reason for choose these bidding behaviors is probably that the bidders un-
derstand the auctions well after so many transactions. Or, maybe, they simply
have more time to spend on the online auction platform.
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2.5 Conclusions
In sum, the data I gathered from eBay support the theory that incremental
bidders will pay less than proxy bidders when they really understand the ad-
vantage of this strategy and make use of it. These bidders, contradicting the
traditional view, are not naive at all. They move back and forth among auc-
tions to nd the best opportunities which allow them to win more and pay less.
However, not all the incremental bidders are sophisticated. If they stick to
one auction and do not switch around, they cannot do better than the proxy
bidders. Further, when some incremental bidders fail to bid their true values
before auctions end, last-minute bidders have chances to win an item at a low
price.
Moreover, when more auctions are constructed at the same time, bidders are
less likely to snipe. This is reected in the estimation results that the number
of last-minute bidders decreases with the number of concurrent auctions. On
the other side, buyers are more likely to choose incremental bidding when there
are more concurrent auctions. With the prompt development of electronic
commerce, I expect to see more and more competing online auctions running in
parallel in the real world. Thus the incremental bidding behavior will be ob-
served more frequently. Instead of treating it as some non-equilibrium behavior,
we need to examine this bidding behavior more seriously in future studies.
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2.6 Chapter Appendix














Total N of Bids N of Bidders Price
non-peak (20pm-8am) 841 23.96 12.30 326.4
peak (8am-20pm) 3416 26.03 12.79 323.6















Figure 2.3: An Example of Auction Listings on eBay
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Chapter 3
Texas School Milk Market Revisited
3.1 Introduction
Every year school districts around the US conduct procurements on the provi-
sion of milk for the next academic year. During the 1990s, there were numerous
antitrust cases against the school milk suppliers and evidences of collusion in
the procurements were uncovered in more than twenty states. Texas was one of
them. In early 90s, the school districts in Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW hereafter)
suspect the presence of a bidding ring in the procurement auctions and led
a complaint to the Texas Attorney Generals o¢ ce. The resulting proceed-
ings ended in a damage settlement in which nine companies paid $15.4 million
dollars. All of these milk processors pleaded guilty in the criminal trials.
There are several existing papers focus on modeling and detecting the collu-
sions in the school milk markets. Porter and Zona (1999) study the Ohio school
milk market. They argue that competitive bids of milk processors should be
a monotonically increasing function of the distance between the school district
and the processing plant. The reason is that nearby districts are less costly to
serve. Porter and Zona nd that the defendants bids are lower on districts
further away and they use this as evidence for a collusive agreement among
the rms. Hewitt, McClave and Sibley (1993) examine the Texas school milk
market and nd evidence of a complementary bidding scheme that they believe
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to be only consistent with collusive behavior.10
Some other authors use the data of the procurements to explore other ques-
tions. Marshall, Rai¤, Richard and Schulenberg (2006) construct a procurement
model allowing for cost synergies. They select data from a time period when
bidders are believed to act non-cooperatively and their estimation results sup-
port the existence of cost synergies. Tichy (2000) examines the data from the
aspect of school districts. She tries to nd out how a school district o¢ cial
determines the winner and she does an estimation on the scoring function of
the districts.
This paper adds to the literature on school milk procurement auctions in
following ways. Unlike most papers on collusion, I rst construct some simple
scoring functions for the bids in order to make use of the data from every type of
milk products. Then with the data constructed, I do some regression analysis
that is similar to Porter and Zona (1999). However, I also include the impacts
of cost synergies and backlogs. This allows me to understand the processors
bidding behavior in a more complete way. As Marshall et al. (2006) suggest,
adding in cost synergies sheds doubts on the existing models of collusions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I describe the background
of the school milk procurements in Texas. In Section 3.3 shows the statistics
and adjustment of data. The inuences of the market characteristics on milk
rmsbidding behavior are discussed. The estimation model and results are
presented in Section 3.4. A further discussion on collusive behaviors is in
10There are more studies on this topic. Pesendorfer (2000) compares the structure of the
cartels in the Florida and Texas school milk markets. Lee (1999) focuses on testing Folk
Theorem in a repeated game in the Texas market.
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Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Texas School Milk Market Background
According to a study conducted by the Department of Agriculture, the school
milk procurements are mainly rst price sealed bid auctions. Usually an auc-
tion starts in spring when the district o¢ cials begin to solicit bids on the supply
contracts. The auctions are publicly announced and contain detailed informa-
tion including the quantities and types of milk needed in each district. The
milk processors have several weeks to make decisions and submit their bids for
each type of milk. Then on the day of letting, bids are opened and made public.
The winner, usually the lowest bidder will be selected. The school districts con-
duct the auctions independently and sequentially. The bidding season usually
lasts from May to August.
Originally, the data set on Texas school milk contains information on auc-
tions held between 1980 and 1990. During those years seven large companies
Borden, Cabell, Foremost, Oak Farms, Preston, Schepps and Vandervoort, are
the major suppliers in the school milk market of the DFW area. They won
around 80 percent of the auctions held in 1980s. Besides, six smaller dairy
processors also submitted bids to the school districts. The seven large com-
panies were all included in the alleged conspirators which were accused by the
school districts in early 90s.
There were some changes in the market structure during the decade. For
example, one of the principal processor Preston entered the market and joined
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the procurement in 1985. The average winning price dropped by about 5%
in that year. Although we need further study to draw the conclusion that
the entry a¤ected the collaboration and brought down the prices, it is quite
possible that the decrease in prices is related to Prestons entry. This paper
aims to explore the factors that inuence the suppliersbidding strategy and
the collaboration among the bidders rather than the e¤ects of the structural
changes. So I will leave this topic for future research and focus on the data
between 1986 and 1990. Here I assume that the entry has little e¤ects after
1985. In other words, it is assumed that the processors adjusted their strategies
promptly and by the beginning of 1986 they already formed a new cartel the
structure of which would not vary much for the following years.11
In Texas school milk market, usually four types of uid milk are sold: whole
white, low-fat chocolate, low-fat white and whole chocolate. The production
process is quite standardized and is almost the same for all milk suppliers. Basi-
cally, to produce uid milk, the processors pasteurize the raw milk, remove the
butterfat and add in avors, vitamins and other nutritious ingredients. There-
fore the major input during the production is the raw milk which is regulated by
Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMO). The FMO price varies regionally and
it equals the Minnesota / Wisconsin price plus an increasing that is roughly in
proportion to the distance between the region and Minnesota / Wisconsin. The
regions are known as Federal Orders and each of them has its own market
11Another reason for this data selection is that in the sample the numbers of contracts in
the earlier years were signicantly smaller. This could be caused by data missing in some
school districts. For this study it is important to look at the same school districts in di¤erent
years, because the incumbent information is crucial.
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administrator who calculates and posts the raw milk prices. The school milk
auctions data sample used in this paper is from the DFW area, which is part
of Federal Order No. 126.
The milk processors purchase raw milk from independent farmers or dairy
cooperatives. They typically have a long-term agreement, which means a milk
processor needs to pay a large amount of penalty if there is a big sudden change
in the quantities purchased. To avoid the penalty, for a 10 percent change, the
processor plant has to inform the farmers or the dairy cooperatives 6 months
in advance. For an increase or decrease of 20 percent, a one year notice is
required. Because of this property of the market, it is reasonable to expect
that each processor only wants to supply a specic volume of milk at any given
time point. Thus they are likely to adjust their bidding strategy based on their
backlogs, which depend on the results of auctions that have already ended.
The processed milk is packed individually in paper cartons or plastic bottles
and stored in crates. Finally it will be shipped to the destinations by cooling
trucks. To each milk processor, the distribution of the milk is the most unique
part of the supply process. Besides the schools, the delivery trucks can also
supply grocery stores, restaurants and other type of consumers on the routes
they drive. To choose the optimal delivery routes for these trucks is a compli-
cated process for a milk supplier. The route assignments are a¤ected by the
locations of the milk consumers and, maybe more importantly, the size of the
contracts. It is relatively easy to accommodate the needs of a small business
on an existed route, but for some large consumers, the milk processors may be
required to arrange some specialized shipment. As they win or lose contracts,
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they are faced with new routing problems.
In sum, the production technologies and input costs in the milk industry are
fairly homogeneous and thus common knowledge. But, the milk processors do
not know how other processors will solve their routing problems and how the
contract of a specic school district can a¤ect their delivery costs. Sometimes
winning a district can help the processor to arrange a route and reduce the
shipping costs. While aiming at selling the desired volume of milk each year,
the processors should also consider which districtscontracts can make them
deliver the milk the most e¢ ciently.
The characteristics of Texas school milk market can facilitates the ability
of milk processors to collude. As mentioned above, the bidders have similar
production costs. When a school district announces a procurement auction,
the district o¢ cial will specify the type and quantities of milk needed. So the
milk processors only compete in the prices which simplify the cartel operation.
When an auction ends, all the bids are posted and if a cartel member cheats and
undercut the bid, other members can nd it out very easily. Whats more, each
year there are hundreds of auctions during the bidding season but they are held
at di¤erent times. This not only makes it possible for the cartel members to
allocate the market, but also allows them to punish a deviating bidder promptly.
3.3 Data Description
As mentioned above, data set used in this paper includes procurement auctions
conducted between 1986 and 1990. The number of auctions per year is ap-
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proximately 130 and the number is roughly constant across years. The total
number of auctions is 678 auctions were held in total. For each auction, the
data set provides information from many aspects: the name and the location
of the school district, the school population in the district, the letting date,
the identities and bidding prices of the companies, the identity of the winner,
the quantities supplied, number of stops needed, distance, types of bids and
whether a cooler is required. Table 3.1 lists and denes variables that are used
in the empirical analyses. In what follows, I will discuss the main variables,
how they are measured and their relavance to the model.
3.3.1 Scoring Function
I begin with bids. In the milk procurement auctions, when submitting a bid, the
bidder does not just submit one price. Instead, he needs to specify the bidding
prices for each milk item. To analyze rmsstrategies, the rst question may
be how to compare two bids with di¤erent components. The bidding prices,
per half pint, for each type of milk are given in the sample. However, the school
districts do not explain explicitly how they choose the winner. To undertake
the empirical analysis, I need to map these multi-dimensional bidding prices
into a single bid. Since the products and services provided by the processors
are almost identical, it is reasonable to assume that the school districts are only
sensitive to the prices of the products, or say, the total payment to the suppliers.
Thus, I use the most straightforward way to map the bids into one dimension:
a weighted average is calculated based on the quantities of each kind of milk
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Table 3.1: Variable Denitions
Dependent Variables
PARTICIPATION One if a rm places a bid in a district, zero otherwise.
BID The natural log of the deated scored bids.
Independent Variables - Continuous
SIZE The estimated quantity to be supplied in each contract.
SEASON The percentage of bid season (measured by days) that has passed.
NUMBID The number of bidders in the auction.
DISTANCE The approximate distance (in miles) between plant and district.
NUMSTOP The natural log of the estimated total number of stops per week
that are needed to supply the district. The number of stops is
calculated by multiplying the number of deliveries per week and
the number of schools in the district.
RAWMILK The natural log of the price of raw milk which is the FMO price
for Order 126.
BACKLOG The up-to-date performance compared with history. Dened as
in 3.3.5.
Independent Variables - Dummy
INCUMBENCY One if the rm has won the contract of the same district in the
previous year, zero otherwise.
ESCALATOR One if the bid is an escalated price, zero otherwise.
COOLER One if coolers are provided, zero otherwise.
FAVORABLE One if the district is located in a favorable area as dened in
3.3.7, zero otherwise.
SMALL One if the size of the district is less than 160,000, zero otherwise.
PASTLOSER One if a rm participated but lost in the year before, zero otherwise.
LOST One if the rm lost an adjacent district in that year, zero otherwise.
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listed in the contract.12
Besides, the bidding prices are also adjusted for ination occurred during
the sample time period. To capture the e¤ects of ination on costs and bidding
prices, the one-dimension weighted bids are deated by the CPI of Dallas. Year
1986 is served as the base year.
3.3.2 Fixed Bids versus Escalated Bids
Almost every auction allows the milk companies to submit two types of bids:
a xed bid or an escalated bid. The bid with an escalator clause allows the
milk supplier to adjust the prices up or down according to the movement in the
price of raw milk, while the xed bid will not vary during the school year. In
the data set, the escalated bids are always lower than the xed bids. The rst
possible explanation for this di¤erence is the risks associated with the two types
of bids. For a xed bid, the milk processor will tolerate the risk of unexpected
changes in the raw milk price. And the school district will take this risk if an
escalated bid is accepted.
However, the pattern of the uctuation in the raw milk price is another
crucial reason for the di¤erence between the two types of bids. Figure 3.1 shows
the monthly FMO price of Federal Order 126 between 1986 and 1990.13 The
gure illustrates a seasonal nature, which is consistent throughout the years, of
12This weighting is also supported by Tichy (2000) who carefully estimates the scoring
function of the school districts. She examines many factors which potentially a¤ect the score
and cannot reject the hypothesis that the school districts use the quantities of di¤erent milk
item as the weight to decide the winner.
13The price is deated by the CPI in Dallas. Year 1986 is the base year.
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the raw milk price. The change in the price is simply caused by the demand
and supply in the market. The demand for the raw milk is the lowest in late
spring and summer when schools are closed and the weather is hot. It peaks
in early winter around the holiday season. The production, however, reaches
its peak in the spring when the weather is the most favorable and cows start a
new lactation cycle. It decreases a little during the hot summer and increases
again in the fall. When the weather is cold in winter, the production reaches
its valley. As a result, the raw milk price is high during the winter and low in
late spring and summer.
This seasonal variation is well known in the milk industry. The school milk
auctions are mostly held between May and August, when the raw milk price
is at its bottom. Both the school districts and the milk processors expect the
raw milk price to increase as the school year begins. With this expectation,
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they know that the escalated bidding price will go up later. If a risk-neutral
bidder submits a xed bid and an escalated bid for the same contract, this bid
pair should be equivalent. Since the escalated bid will increase and the xed
bid will remain constant, the former one must be lower than the latter on at
the starting point which is the letting date.
3.3.3 Contract Size
The size of a procurement can be measured by the total volume of milk de-
manded by a school district. It can have some potential inuences on the
underlying costs and thus the bids submitted. First of all, school districts usu-
ally have requirements on delivery time and the processors need to unload the
milk products during certain time slot. To unload a large quantity of milk may
involve some e¢ ciency for the supplier. Also, if the school district has a high
demand, it is usually because that the district is highly populated. A pop-
ulated district typically has more and better paved roads together with more
grocery stores and restaurant, which could provide exibility for a processor to
choose the delivery route. However, on the side, winning a large procurement
could also make the routing problem more di¢ cult. A large amount of products
would require more capacity on a truck. Therefore, it may not be possible to
add the school on the existing routes and a milk company may have to arrange
a specialized delivery. In sum, the contract size has an ambiguous impact on
delivery costs and bids
Besides costs, there is another reason that may make milk processors favor
large contracts. Typically a processor has a targeted volume to supply each
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year, because of the long agreement with farmers. Winning large quantities
allows the processors to reach their goals more quickly as long as they still
have enough capacities. So if a rm still has excess volume at the end of
season, large contracts would look attractive and the rm may be willing to bid
more aggressively and bring down the prices. The e¤ects of excess volume and
backlog will be further discussed later on in Section 3.3.4.
When a procurement is announced, the school district will post the esti-
mated total quantities to supply. Though the actual quantities may deviates
from the estimate, the di¤erence is believed to be small. And it is reasonable
to assume that processors make bidding decisions based on the estimate if they
do not have better knowledge. Based on the estimated quantities in the data,
I divide the auctions into four categories, each of which counts for about one
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quarter of the observations. Figure 3.2 presents the average winning bid of each
category by year. It shows the bids of larger contracts tend to be lower and
especially, the winning bids of the largest procurements are signicantly lower.
A similar pattern can be found if losing bids are also included. This provides us
a straightforward view of the impacts of contract size on bids and I will control
other relevant factors and investigate this impact in a more complete model.
3.3.4 Season
Though the procurement season usually starts in May, most of the auctions are
conducted in late summer. Only about 10 percent of the procurements take
place in May and the percentage of auctions held in June is most doubled. In
July and August, the proportions are both around 35 percent. This trend is
shown in Figure 3.3, which shows the cumulative distribution of contracts held
in each month. The letting time of di¤erent category is also presented in the
gure. It seems that larger school districts hold the auctions relatively earlier.
Almost all the smaller auctions, which are included in the two categories with
quantities below 160,000, occur in July and August. On the other side, 90
percent of the largest auctions are held during the rst three months. One
fact behind the gure is that each school district tends to conduct its auction
at roughly the same time each year. It implies the choice of timing is not likely
to be a¤ected by the market.
Figure 3.4 shows the average winning bids in early and late summer. The
winning bids of auctions conducted in May and June are generally higher than
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those in July and August. Since larger procurements occur relatively early, this
seems to a conict with the observations from Figure 3.2 that winning bids are
lower in large districts. However, this conict is a key to study the processors
bidding behavior. Besides the contract size, what could be the factors that
a¤ect the bids? Is the decrease in bidding prices related with cost synergy or
collusion? It will be explored in the regression analysis.
3.3.5 Backlog
Because of the long-run contract between them and farmers or milk coopera-
tives, the milk processors have to pay for a nearly xed volume of raw milk each
year in order to avoid large nancial penalties. This xed volume is typically
set well before school milk auction season. Thus, it is reasonable to believe
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that each milk rm has a targeted total quantity to win every year. They
are supposed to make plans forehead and submit bids based according to the
plans. If they are rational, at every time point, their bidding strategies should
be a¤ected by the whole bidding history, which requires lots of knowledge. Or,
they can make things a little simpler by just looking at the progresses they have
already made towards their goals. If they fall behind the plans or they have
lots of excess volume, they would bid more aggressively and submit lower bids.
On the contrary, if a rm has won a large amount of auctions, the incentive to
win would be lessened.
A related question for my study would be how to nd out their targets given
the fact that we cannot tell directly whether they fulll the goals each year from
the data set. However, as you look more closely on the data, you will see that
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the quantity which a processor supplies does not vary to a large extent from
year to year. For the ve largest milk processors, Figure 3.5 tells the percentage
changes in the total quantities won by a given rm. Generally, the uctuations
in the quantities between two subsequent years are within 10 percent. We can
have a guess on current goals based on their past experience.
When there is a change in the total quantity supplied by a milk rm, we
need to take into consideration of two possible reasons: the rm adjusts the goal
or the rm fails to meet the goal. I will just assume that each reason counts
for half of the change. In other words, I use the average of the actual total
quantity supplied by a rm in the year t-1 and in the year t as the targeted
quantity for the rm in year t. This would be a close estimate of the actual
goal when the uctuations of quantities are not big, which is satised by the
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data set.
After getting the targets, I construct the variable, which is called the backlog
here, to reect a rms performance and how close the rm is to its goal. The
backlog is built serving this purpose. For each rm, we can get its market share
in the previous year by calculating the proportion of the quantities won by that
rm. In the long run, when the rms supply relatively constant volume of milk,
the market share of each rm tends to be roughly constant. If the rms have
no big di¤erences in their preferences, their current market shares can serve as
a measure of their performance.
For example, if a rm won 20 percent of the market in the previous year and
has won 15 percent of the quantities at some given point of the current bidding
season, it implies that this rm need to bid more aggressively and won a larger
proportion in the remaining season. The backlog variable is a percentage ratio
that illustrates this impact on bidding strategies. The ratio is the di¤erence
between a rms current market share and its previous market share divided
by the previous share. As in the example above, the backlog of the rm
at that time point would be (15%   20%)=20%  100% =  25. A positive
number implies that the processor is winning more quantities than before while
a negative value may imply that the processor is not doing so well.
The backlog variable would lost its meaning when the bidding season just
starts, because winning or lose a contract would have a huge e¤ect on a rms
market shares. At the extreme, after the rst auction, one rm will have
the whole market and other have zero shares. However, we do not expect the
winning rms to cool down its bidding process or the other rms to bid more
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actively. It is just too early to tell how they are doing. For this reason, I set the
backlog variable to zero for auctions occurred in May which means the backlog
has no e¤ects in the early season. Actually, in the data set, no incumbents ever
lose an auction in May. This phenomenon is consistent with the scenario when
backlogs are zero. Basically they both mean that the rms are doing just as
well as they did in the previous year.14
3.3.6 Incumbency
Throughout the years, a majority of auctions in the market are won by in-
cumbents. If we look at the probabilities of winning for incumbents and non-
incumbents, as illuminated in Figure 3.6, the di¤erence is obvious. Note that,
the winning probability of incumbents (non-incumbents) is dened as the per-
centage of incumbents (non-incumbents) who win, not the percentage of incum-
bents (non-incumbents) within the winners. Thus, the two probabilities do not
add up to one. If a bidder won a contract in the previous year, he is very likely
to win it again in the current year. On average, the probability of winning is
around 80 percent. However, if a bidder is not an incumbent of that district,
the winning probability would be much lower, which is below 20 percent.
If the milk rms only di¤er in costs and do not collaborate with each other,
the high winning probability of incumbent is supposed to be caused by a cost
14The fact that large contracts are conducted relatively early provides some convenience for
this manipulation. Only a little more than 10 percent observations occur in May, but these
auctions count for more than 30 percent of the total quantity. Thus, setting the backlogs of
early auctions to zero still leaves us enough sample points to explore the e¤ects of backlogs.
Meanwhile, given the large quantities that are already sold by the end of May, winning or
losing an auction will no longer inuence a rms market share by a huge amount. Then the
constructed backlog variable is able to capture its meaning.
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advantage. It is not surprising if incumbents really have lower costs for districts
they won. They may know better about the district and have better relation-
ship with the school which could provide them some exibility for unloading
milk products. The truck drivers would be more familiar with the roads. As a
result, the delivery costs could be lower.
The cost advantage allows incumbents to submit lower bids and thus they
would win more often. If this is the fact, the participation of incumbents will
bring down the winning bid even in the cases that the incumbents lose the
auction. In other word, if an incumbent does not participate in the auction for
some reason, the winning bid is expected to be higher, because other bidders
have higher costs. However, a rough compare of winning bids in the two
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situations, when an incumbent participate or not, does not show signicant
di¤erences.15
3.3.7 Favorable Area and Cost Synergy
How to measure delivery costs is probably the most challenging questions in the
study of school milk auctions. The choice of shipping routes is generally private
information. Though economists try to measure the costs using variables like
the number of stops, or the distance between milk plants and schools, the
estimate may not be accurate. Porter and Zona (1999) nd that some milk
rms submit lower bids in the districts which are far away from their plants
and use it as an evidence of the collusion. However, sometimes distances may
not tell the full story.
Suppose there is a small city shown as in Figure 3.7. The black lines are
the boundaries of school districts and districts of the same color are supplied
by the same milk company. One milk rm, whose markets are painted orange,
has only one plant which is located in district A. If there are only two potential
consumers, district D and F, the rm would prefer the closer district F with
everything else equal. However, if it is similar to the case shown in the gure 
all the other districts have already signed contracts with di¤erent rms D and
F are the last two conduct procurements, the rm may choose D over F. The
reason is obvious that as long as the rm has enough capacity on the truck, it
15It is not surprising if the incumbents do not have cost advantages or the advantages have
little impacts on bids. It is not di¢ cult for a new delivery driver to get familiar with routes
and schools. The studying process would not take a long time and may not cause higher bids
from new suppliers.
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only need to add a stop at the district D on the way to C/B/E. But supplying
F requires the rm to arrange a route especially for it, which could be costly
even for a short shipping distance.
This situation is not rare in reality. If we look at the contracts won by milk
rms geographically, we can observe that milk processors often won several
adjacent districts all together. If winning the procurement of a district can
help the rm solve routing problem, the reduction of per unit delivery costs is
considered as cost synergy. Since the letting dates spread over four months
and auction outcomes are not predictable, it is tricky to nd out which districts
can generate synergies.
If a rm is not limited by the room on delivery trucks, it would be e¢ cient to
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supply a cluster of districts that are located closed to each other. It is reasonable
to believe that a milk processor prefers districts that are closed to the districts
won or those which are likely to be won. Thus when an auction is conduct in a
district which satises one of the following two conditions, I would say there is
potential cost synergy.
Among the districts which share boundaries with the potential district,
(i) the rm has won at least one of them; or
(ii) there is at least one district in which the rm was an incumbent in
the previous year and the procurement of the current year has not been held
yet.
Basically, it implies that after winning a district, a rm would become more
interested in it neighborhood area. Due to the fact that an incumbent is highly
likely to win again, I assume rms also prefer to supply places that are close to
their incumbency area, as long as the incumbency districts have not switched
to a new processor. If a district falls into one of the two categories stated
above, it is referred as a favorable area. Since the rmsdelivery route could
be very complicated, they may not only prefer the adjacent districts. Also
the realization cost synergy depends on many factors including the capacity
of delivery trucks. It still requires more complete analysis to see whether the
dened favorable areas are really preferred by the rms.
3.3.8 Summary Statistics
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics for some important variables from
the data sample. Most of the auctions have relatively few participants. The
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average number of bidders is 2.39 and auctions with one to three bidders are
very common.16 Since almost all the incumbents participate in the districts
they won before, the dummy for incumbency status is about the inverse of the
number of bidders, which is 0.41. The table also contains the statistics of all
bids, the winning bids and the losing bids. Throughout the paper, the "bids"
I use are all standardized and adjusted as described in Section 3.3.1. Since the
auctions are procurements, the average winning bids are lower than the mean
of all bids.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: 1986 1990
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Number of Bidders 2.39 0.99 1 7
All Bids (cents/half pint) 17.31 1.57 12.14 22.59
Winning Bids (cents/half pint) 16.66 1.51 12.14 22.03
Losing Bids (cents/half pint) 17.80 1.61 12.37 22.59
Raw milk (cents/half pint) 7.98 0.84 7.41 8.81
Distance (miles) 52.31 12.13 0 139
Size (1000 half pint/year) 454.03 92.28 7.20 8,488
Number of Stops 4.18 1.02 1 5
Incumbency 0.41 0.15 0 1
16Porter and Zona (1999) observe similar phenomenon in the Ohio school milk auctions:
on average very few processors join the bidding. They argue that this is consistent with the




3.4.1 Regressions on Participation Decision
To examine the rmsbidding behavior, I rst run a Probit regression to exam-
ine the participation decisions of the ve large rms. The dependent variable is
PARTICIPATION as shown in Table 3.1, which equals one if the rm submits
a bid in certain district in certain year. The regression results are presented
in Table 3.3. I run the regressions in three ways to study how the cost synergy
a¤ects the rms submission decision. In the rst regressions, variables that
capture the synergy are not included. In the second regression, I use the FA-
VORABLE variable dened above to capture the synergy e¤ect. And in the
last regression, instead of FAVORABLE, I use the LOST variable to see whether
losing an adjacent area will a¤ect a bidders participation. To investigate if the
size would a¤ect the synergy, cross terms are also included.
The positively signicant coe¢ cients on INCUMBENCY and PASTLOSER
tell us that not only the incumbents are more likely to participate, the past
losers are also more likely to bid in the same district they bid before. The
BACKLOG variable measures the up-to date performance of a bidder. When
it is large, it means that the rm has won more than the past. The estimate is
negative which means a rm is less likely to participate when it has won more.
Or in other way, if a rm lost some districts it won in the previous year, the
backlog would be smaller and it is more likely to participate in other districts.
Moreover, rms are more likely to bid for larger district, which is consistent as
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Table 3.3: Probit Model of Bidder Submission
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
CONSTANT 1.927 -1.937 -2.071
(0.151) (0.135) (0.116)
INCUMBENCY 0.089 0.093 0.081
(0.001) (1.001) (0.001)
PASTLOSER 0.061 0.057 0.060
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
NUMSTOP -0.006 -0.007 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
DISTANCE -0.005 -0.004 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
SIZE 0.493 0.453 0.383
(0.112) (0.121) (0.142)
SIZE*DISTANCE -0.022 0.021 0.018
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
BACKLOG -0.014 -0.012 -0.018
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
COOLER -0.043 -0.028 -0.030
(0.038) (0.031) (0.019)
SEASON -0.230 -0.170 -0.092
(0.139) (0.141) (0.090)
FAVORABLE - -0.021 -
- (0.009) -
FAVORABLE*SMALL - -0.042 -
- (0.012) -
LOST - - -0.013
- - (0.010)
LOST*SMALL - - -0.039
- - (0.020)
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.310 0.292
Standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols *, ** denote signicance at the
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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what I found in the regression on bids.
The rms are more likely to bid in FAVORABLEdistricts where there
could be potential cost synergies. And the e¤ect is more signicant in small
districts. Nevertheless, when I use LOSTto measure the geographic reason,
it is not that signicant. I think the reason is that each district has more than
one adjacent district. Losing one adjacent district may not be a serious problem
as long as the rm has won some other district close by. Unless Porter and
Zona found, the DISTANCE variable does not seem to play an important role
here. However, the cross term of SIZE and DISTANCE has a negative estimate,
which implies the rms are more willing to go further for smaller districts. This
is probably because that it is easier to add a stop for smaller districts on the
existing routes.
3.4.2 Regressions on Bidding Levels
To explore how bids are a¤ected by the factors discussed above, I construct
regressions using the available data. The dependent variable is the natural log
of the bids from each auction. The explanatory variables used in the analysis
are from the list in Table 3.1. Table 3.4 presents the results of the estimation
when I include all the available bids, the losing ones and the winning ones. The
left two columns are pooled specications with common intercepts across all
bidders, while right two columns allow separate bidder xed e¤ects. The rst
and the third column are the regressions without considering the impacts of the
cost synergy. In other words, these models do not pay attention to whether a
district is located in a favorable area. And the second and the fourth column
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contain two more variables to explore the cost synergy.
Some of the coe¢ cients support the analysis in section 3.3. For example, the
coe¢ cient of BACKLOG is positive. It means if the rm wins more auctions
(a larger backlog), it will bid less aggressively (a higher bid). Or say, they
are willing to ask for a smaller payment, when they nd out they have small
backlogs and need to win more contracts to make full use of the raw milk they
already buy. This shows that the rmsbidding behavior is very likely to be
a¤ected by the contracts they already win, facing the fact that the volume of
the milk they can supply is almost constant.
As discussed above, the size of a contract has an ambiguous inuence on
the bids. The regression results, especially those from the xed-e¤ects models,
tell that the SIZE variable has a negative sign. That implies the benets
of winning a large procurement  reduction in costs and help for achieving
the rms targeted volume more quickly  overwhelm the problems a large
contract generates. Thus the bidding prices in a large procurement tend to
be lower. ESCALATOR has a negative coe¢ cient which is consistent with the
explanations stated in 3.3.2. The escalated price allows the rm to adjust the
bids with the increase of raw milk price, it is on average lower than the xed
bid. The positive coe¢ cient on COOLER reects the extra costs required for
providing coolers with milk.
The variables that interpret delivery costs also yield some reasonable results.
First of all, NUMSTOP, by denition is the number of stops a rm has to
make in one week. Given the volume of milk, more stops would require more
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Table 3.4: Regressions of All Bids
Basic Model Bidder Fixed E¤ects Model
Variables w/o synergy w/ synergy w/o synergy w/ synergy
CONSTANT 4.324 4.353 4.339 4.321
(0.403) (0.387) (0.402) (0.411)
SIZE -3.03 -2.57 -3.43 -2.68
(1.98) (1.58) (0.49) (0.34)
SEASON -0.183 -0.131 -0.178 -0.135
(0.030) (0.062) (0.038) (0.562)
NUMBID 0.028 0.023 0.018 0.017
(0.016) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008)
INCUMBENCY -0.244 -0.228 -0.249 -0.212
(0.015) (0.035) (0.014) (0.028)
DISTANCE 0.302 0.343 0.321 0.417
(0.187) (0.168) (0.200) (0.189)
NUMSTOP 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.034
(0.032) (0.027) (0.013) (0.014)
BACKLOG 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
RAWMILK 0.283 0.249 0.252 0.341
(0.194) (0.161) (0.181) (0.213)
ESCALATOR -6.039 -5.739 -5.881 -6.282
(1.816) (1.902) (1.759) (2.043)
COOLER 3.842 3.667 3.431 3.782
(1.214) (1.212) (1.255) (1.213)
FAVORABLE - -0.089 - -0.085
- (0.072) - (0.062)
FAVORABLE*SMALL - -0.024 - -0.019
- (0.009) - (0.008)
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.317 0.364 0.383
Standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols *, ** denote signicance at the
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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coordination between truck drivers and schools, more diesel fuel, and more
services like unloading products. Therefore the positive sign is consistent with
the reality that a larger number of stops asks for a higher delivery cost and, as
a result, a higher bid.
In the models without the cost synergy, DISTANCE is not signicant. 17
However, after controlling for the potential cost synergy area, the bids do show
some negative relationship with the distance. So, I cannot observe any col-
lusion just by looking at the coe¢ cient on DISTANCE. The regressions with
FAVORABLE and the product of FAVORABLE*SMALL show how the cost
synergy can a¤ect the bids. SMALL is the dummy for districts with smaller
need, which counts for almost 50 percent of all the contracts. When this cross-
term is included, FAVORABLE is not signicant but the product is. This tells
us the relatively small contracts do help rms design deliver route and reduce
the cost. The larger ones, which would need more capacities, do not generate
any synergies.
The di¤erence between bids submitted in early season and late season is also
captured by the regression. The coe¢ cient of SEASON is negative and signif-
icant even when the impact of cost synergy is considered. Holding everything
else constant, from the beginning of the season to the end, the bidding level
could on average decrease by more than 10 percent. This phenomenon cannot
be explained by other factors and is possibly the result of collusion. More to
discussed in Session 3.5.
17Porter and Zona (1999) have a similar result and argue that rms sometimes submit lower
bids in farther areas. They use it as an important evidence for the existence of bidding-ring.
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In a competitive market, a procurement price is expected to decrease as the
number of bidders increases. However, here, the estimate of the coe¢ cient on
NUMBID is either insignicant (in basic models) or is positive (in xed e¤ects
models). Meanwhile the INCUMBENCY shows that incumbents do submit
lower bids than other bidders. It is still too early to tell whether these results
are caused by collusion. The incumbents may have some cost advantages which
allow them to bid less. Then when other non-incumbent bidders participate in
the auction, they do not only bring in competition, but also bidders with higher
costs. And since the average number of bidders is very low, the cost advantage
of incumbents can explain the results. Therefore, to see whether the lower bids
are caused by cost advantage, we need to do more regression analysis.
Table 3.5 presents the results of regressions with the same group of variables
on the winning bids. The models of the four columns are the same and in gen-
eral, the estimations generate similar results as the previous table. However,
the number of bidder is never signicant in the regressions on winning bids.
What is more important, the coe¢ cient of INCUMBENCY changes into a pos-
itive one. It implies that the incumbents can get some premium when they
win. Now it is not easy to tell whether incumbents have cost advantages.
On one side, the change in the sign of INCUMBENCY could to be caused by
the presence of a bidding-ring. The rms may have agreement with each other
and have already divided the market. Their agreement can be very simple, for
example, each district is assigned to the incumbent. To make the collusion less
detectable to the anti-trust o¢ cials, rms also participate in auctions that they
are not supposed to win. Thus they would submit some relatively high bids in
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Table 3.5: Regressions of Winning Bids
Basic Model Bidder Fixed E¤ects Model
Variables w/o synergy w/ synergy w/o synergy w/ synergy
CONSTANT 4.287 4.441 5.022 5.831
(0.387) (0.299) (0.397) (0.401)
SIZE -3.67 -2.43 -4.11 -2.64
(1.68) (1.12) (0.943) (0.893)
SEASON -0.194 -0.189 -0.183 -0.177
(0.028) (0.091) (0.036) (0.068)
NUMBID 0.019 0.027 0.018 0.017
(0.014) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011)
INCUMBENCY 0.207 0.236 0.249 0.242
(0.014) (0.039) (0.014) (0.032)
DISTANCE 0.301 0.395 0.323 0.436
(0.232) (0.201) (0.242) (0.212)
NUMSTOP 0.028 0.035 0.034 0.038
(0.017) (0.029) (0.011) (0.011)
BACKLOG 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
RAWMILK 0.270 0.256 0.239 0.258
(0.212) (0.221) (0.231) (0.247)
ESCALATOR -6.017 -5.823 -5.839 -6.034
(1.496) (1.714) (1.702) (1.839)
COOLER 3.704 3.761 3.779 3.743
(1.361) (1.325) (1.375) (1.285)
FAVORABLE - -0.067 - -0.064
- (0.073) - (0.058)
FAVORABLE*SMALL - -0.019 - -0.021
- (0.008) - (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.317 0.373 0.384
Standard errors are in parentheses.The symbols *, **denote signicance at the
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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these auctions. If this is the case, it would be observed that the incumbents
bids are lower on overage and the winning incumbents can have a premium.
However, there may be some rm that cheats or some unexpected bidder that
is not a member of the bidding ring. If they o¤er a lower price than the
incumbents, the districts will be supplied by a new processor. So if we look at
the districts where the non-incumbents win, the winning bidding price would
be lower. That can explain why the INCUMBENCY has a negative coe¢ cient
in regressions on all bids, but a positive one in regressions on winning bids.
However, on the other side, a competitive environment may also lead to a
similar result. If there is perfect competition and rmsbids are determined by
their costs. The high winning probability of incumbents must be caused by the
cost advantage and this is consistent with the results in Table 3.4. The non-
incumbents win only when they have negative cost shocks or they are willing to
accept lower prots. In this situation, the incumbentswinning bids are more
likely to be higher than the non-incumbents winning bids.
The impacts of other factors are almost the same as those in regressions on
all bids. The BACKLOG has a positive e¤ect on both the winning bids and
losing bids, which suggests the rms do adjust their strategy according to their
current performance. After the cost synergy is introduced, the DISTANCE
variable becomes signicant. The rms do care about the distances. However,
they care more about how to win a cluster of district together. Just like the
case shown in 3.3.7, compare with winning a closer district, a rm may prefer
to win a farther district which can help reduce per unit delivery cost.
Since the cost synergy only can be found in smaller districts and smaller
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districts typically hole the procurements in late summer, it is reasonable to
say that the decrease of bidding prices at the end of the season as observed
in 3.3.4 is partly caused by the potential cost synergy. Nevertheless, in all
the regressions, the SEASON variable is always signicant. There must still
be some date-related factors that have not been captured by the models. One
possible explanation is the change of the collusive behaviors of the bidders across
the season.
3.5 More Discussion on Collusion
Table 3.6: Timing of Changes in Incumbency
(by Percentages of Bidding Seasons)






To see why incumbents are much more likely to win than other bidders
and whether there is collusion, it may be a good idea to take a look at the
cases in which they do not win. Table 3.6 shows the timing of the changes in
incumbency. It is measured by the percentage of days that have already passed
during the bidding season when the change occurs. In general, a majority of the
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changes take place in the latter half of the season. Usually there is no switch of
incumbents until June when about 30 percent of the bidding season has already
passed. And on average, the changes occur at the end of the season when 80
percent of days are gone.
Given that large contracts are conducted at early times, if we calculate
the timing by measuring the quantities which have already been assigned, the
percentage numbers would be even bigger. This phenomenon does provide some
supports of the existence of collusion among the bidders. Recall that one of
the markets characteristic that facilitates collusion is that the cartel members
can punish the cheaters quite quickly. If some rm cheats at the beginning of
a season, the cost of deviating from collusion would be huge. However, at the
end of summer, after most auctions are nished, the punishment may not be
very e¤ective any more. The rms are not going to meet each others till the
next spring and it is not likely that they will still remember to punish a cheater
from the previous year. As a result, at the end of a bidding season, the market
would become more competitive.
3.6 Conclusion Remarks
This chapter studies procurement data in the Texas school milk market. With
a careful analysis of the characteristics of the market, I try to capture most
potential factors that can a¤ect the bidding strategies of rms. After con-
structing a method to score all the bids, I do regression analysis in di¤erent
settings. Some of the regression results, like the coe¢ cients on the size of con-
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tracts, escalated bids, coolers, are similar to the outcomes of previous works.
The backlog variable a¤ects the bids in the same direction, which means a bid-
der who wins more contracts than he used to be would slow down his steps and
bid less aggressively.
The introduction of cost synergies provides a new aspect to the study of
the collusion. With the data of DFW area, we can no longer use Porter and
Zona (1999)s argument for detecting bid rigging. Therefore I point another
two facts that may serve as the evidence for the existence of collusion. The
rst is the opposite signs of the estimates of incumbency on winning bids and
on all types of bids. The second is the signicant decrease in the bid level
at the end of the bidding season, which could be the result of a collapse down
of collusion. Nevertheless, the contribution of this chapter is more modest
than detect the collusion in the school milk market. Instead I provide a more
complete way to characterize rms bidding behavior which can provide some
insights for modeling the collusion.
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